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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation explores the role of family and gender in understanding the 
disparities in human capital accumulation and corresponding disparities in labor market 
outcomes.  
             The first chapter explores the relationship between workers’ wages and the gender 
of their supervisor, conditioning on the occupational gender composition. It develops a 
theoretical model suggesting that supervisors’ task assignment accuracy is affected 
disparately in occupations of different gender types, leading to varying degrees of skill 
mismatch among workers. This leads to average wage differences between workers with 
female supervisors and those with male supervisors in occupations of different gender 
types. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence suggests that 
workers have better occupation-skill matches and higher average wages if they work with 
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, compared to those with male 
supervisors; the opposite is true for workers in predominantly male occupations. Although 
not significant at the early career stage, supervisor wage effects emerge as a worker’s career 
develops. These findings emphasize the importance of supervisors’ task assignment 
accuracy in workplace gender wage disparity, and underscore the necessity of integrating 
minority managers to the “gendered” organizational contexts.    
         The second chapter examines the extent to which children enter occupations that are 
different from their father’s occupation, but require similar skills, which we call task 
vi 
following. We distinguish between task followers and occupational followers, considering 
the possibility that fathers can transfer task specific human capital either through 
investments or genetic endowments to their children. We show that there is indeed 
substantial task following, beyond occupational following and that task following is 
associated with a wage premium of around 5% over otherwise identical workers employed 
in a job with the same primary task. The wage premium is robust to controls for industry, 
occupation categories and occupation characteristics. The premium is largest for followers 
in non-routine cognitive jobs and college graduates. 
       Using a nationally representative sample, the third chapter sheds light on whether and 
how cadre parents affect their offspring's labor market outcomes in China. On the one hand, 
individuals with a cadre parent tend to have higher promotion rates over those without a 
cadre parent. On the other hand, evidence does reveal a 10% cadre parent wage premium 
at the mean level, which is not attributable to individual, parental and occupational 
characteristics. Most of this premium can be explained by individual’s larger size of social 
networks and closer relations with government officials and people from the public owned 
enterprises. This suggests that social networks may be one of the mechanisms through 
which cadre parents benefit the labor market outcomes of the next generation. 
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CHAPTER 1
DIVERSITY IS MORE THAN NUMBERS: THE WAGE EFFECTS OF 
SUPERVISOR-WORKER GENDER MATCH  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Does the gender of supervisor have any effect on the wages of the subordinate? The 
answer to this question has important policy implication; specifically, can the workplace 
gender wage gap be narrowed by imposing gender quotas1 in managerial positions (e.g. 
Ridgeway, 1997;  Hultin and Szulkin, 2003; Gorman, 2005; Hensvik, 2014).   
 However, the existing evidence on the direction and the significance of the 
relationship is mixed. Although the literature has documented that female supervisors have 
positive effects on female workers’ career outcomes (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003; Beckman 
and Phillips, 2005; Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Flabbi, Macis, Moro and Schivardi, 2014; 
Matsa and Miller, 2011)2 , this pattern is challenged by other empirical findings. For 
instance, some research finds that women earn higher wages when working with a male 
                                                          
1 Imposing gender quotas in top management groups has been a common practice in most European countries. 
Countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, Iceland, and Italy impose mandatory quotas of female board 
members. Countries like Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK adopt voluntary goals 
for female representation (25%-40%). Currently, the US has no voluntary or mandatory quotas of female 
board members. There is a discussion on whether it is necessary to adopt such quota in the US. (Source: 
Margarethe Wiersema and Marie Louise Mors “What Board Directors Really Think of Gender Quotas” 
Harvard Business Review, Nov. 14, 2016. https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-board-directors-really-think-of-
gender-quotas).     
2 Within this particular literature, some researchers use the proportion of female managers as exploratory 
variable, indicating that greater representation of females in powerful positions would result in higher average 
wages (Bell 2005; Hultin and Szulkin 1999; Kunze and Miller 2014; Maume and Ruppanner 2015; Tate and 
Yang 2015) and better career outcomes for female employees (Bell, Smith, Smith, and Verner 2008; Gorman 
2005; Matsa and Miller 2011). Another literature matches employees with their direct supervisors (Gorman 
2005; Hensvik 2011; Lucifora and Vigani 2016). For a summary of literature, see Appendix A. 
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supervisor   (Rothstein, 1997).  Evidence also shows that female supervisors devaluate 
women even more than do male supervisors (Heilman and Haynes, 2005; Mavin, 2006; 
Maume, 2011): a pattern referred to as the “Queen-Bee Syndrome” (Staines, Tavris, and 
Jayaratne, 1974; Cooper, 1997). In addition, some researchers argue that the gender of 
supervisor simply has no effect on workers’ wages when workers’ unobserved 
characteristics are controlled for (Fadlon, 2010; Penner and Toro-Tulla, 2010; Penner, 
Toro-Tulla and Huffman, 2012; Bednar and Gicheva, 2014; Hensvik, 2014; Sicilian and 
Grossberg, 2014; Marianne, Black, Jensen and Lleras-Muney, 2014). These mixed findings, 
however, cannot be reconciled using the traditional taste-based discrimination or statistical 
discrimination models, pointing to previously unexplored mechanisms. 3   
          Figure 1.1 presents the stylized facts from basic wage regressions that motivates this 
research. 4 I divided workers in the NLSY97 core sample into two groups: workers with 
female supervisor (blue solid line) and workers with male supervisor (red dashed line); 
then I plot the residual wages along the spectrum of occupational share of female workers. 
A pattern emerges: in predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors 
                                                          
3 According to the taste-based discrimination theory (Becker, 1957) supervisors favor same-gender workers 
against opposite-gender ones. Statistical discrimination theory (Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977) 
indicates that incomplete information and workers’ exogenous group differences contribute to employment 
disparities, even if supervisors do not have subjective preferences. Following this, some theoretical models 
suggest that supervisors are better informed of workers’ unobserved productivity when they share the same 
cultural group (e.g., gender, race, and ethnicity) (Athey, Avery, and Zemsky, 2000, Altonji and Pierret, 1997, 
Cornell and Welch,1996, Oettinger, 1996). Whichever theory applies, one may expect to observe empirically 
that workers are more likely to receive higher wages when working with a same-gender supervisor than with 
a supervisor of the opposite-gender. However, this pattern is not consistently observed in the aforementioned 
empirical literature.  
4 To obtain the residual wages, I regress one’s natural log of real hourly wages (in 2002’s dollar value) on a 
set of demographic characteristics (race, highest years of education, experience, average percentile ranks of 
ASVAB scores, employer tenure, occupational tenure as well as their polynomials) and a set of occupational 
characteristics (average percentile ranks of O*NET occupation skill requirements, one-digit occupation 
groups, one-digit industry groups).  Details on variables and definition of match measures is given in Section 
1.3. To construct the lines shown in the figure, I ran local polynomial regressions with residual wages on 
occupational feminization rate for each group of workers.  
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earn higher wages than would be expected based on their demographic and occupational 
characteristics, compared to workers with male supervisors; the opposite is true for workers 
in predominantly male occupations. These suggest that supervisors’ wage effects may vary 
conditioning on occupational gender composition. An explanation proposed by this 
study is that male and female supervisors’ staffing decision is affected disparately in 
occupations of different gender types. In occupations of different gender types, male and 
female supervisors are attached disparately to the gendered culture and social networks 
(Ridgeway and England 2007, 199-200; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2015). For example, 
female managers are more likely to be marginalized in predominantly male occupations;5 
this excludes them from getting access to vital information on inner-organization resource 
allocation. In predominantly female occupations, although men have benefited from their 
minority status in terms of better career development (Bradley, 1993), the contradictions 
between their masculinity and the feminized occupational sub-culture alienate them from 
the female staff (Williams, 1993; Simpson, 2004). It follows that, in occupations populated 
by opposite-gender workers, supervisors may themselves be the victims of information 
distortion which will compromise their effectiveness in staffing decisions (Kanter, 1977, 
Ely, 1995, Cohen and Huffman, 2007). This leads to the varying degrees of skill mismatch 
among workers, conditioning on the occupational gender composition. Figure 1.2 6 
illustrates this point by showing that workers have better match qualities with the female 
                                                          
5 The marginalization is mainly reflected as the exclusion from the “old boy networks”. The “old boy network” 
is an informal male social system that stretches within and across organizations, and excludes all women 
from membership (Lipman-Blumen, 1976). Kanter’s (1977) early work on ‘token’ women point to systems 
of bias and discrimination whereby the dominant (male) group controls the group culture and through various 
processes marginalizes and excludes the minority of women.  
6 To obtain the figure, I ran local polynomial regressions with individual's total extent of skill mismatch 
(normalized to have a standard deviation of 1) on occupational share of female workers for each group of 
workers. 
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supervisors in female-predominant occupations, compared to their counterparts with male 
supervisors; the opposite is true in male-predominant occupations. Greater skill mismatch 
is associated with productivity loss (Guvenen, Kuruscu, Tanaka and Wiczer, 2016), which 
leads to the stylized wage facts in Figure 1.1.  
Motivated by these, this present study explores (1) the relationship between 
workers’ wages and the gender of their supervisors, conditioning on occupational gender 
composition, and (2) the underlying mechanism that leads to the observed wage patterns.  
I extend the theoretical models in Phelps (1972), Cornell and Welch (1996) and Oettinger 
(1996), assuming male and female supervisors are affected disparately by information 
distortion in occupations comprising different gender types. This information distortion 
affects how workers (with premarket “skill” attributes) are matched to occupations (defined 
as their task and skill requirements). Supervisors’ information bias, skill mismatch and job 
changes contribute to the observed supervisor wage effects that emerge as workers’ 
experience accumulates. Empirical results indicate that in male-predominant occupations, 
a worker with a female supervisor has greater extent of skill mismatch and lower wages on 
average, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor; the opposite is true in 
female-predominant occupations. Further, even if not apparent initially, wage disparities 
emerge and enlarge as one’s career develops. The latter result reflects the fact that workers 
receive a higher return to experience with female supervisors in female-predominant 
occupations, and male supervisors in male-predominant occupations. The empirical 
evidence also indicates that the observed wage pattern does not come from the gender-
based skill sorting across occupations; and there is no evidence to suggest that the gender 
of supervisor will affect workers’ wages through affecting workers’ promotion prospects.  
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 The main lesson conveyed by this study is that gender diversity is not just 
workforce composition but also interaction. Although gender quotas in managerial 
positions do help to “break the glass ceilings,” the empirical evidence presented in this 
study shows that supervisors’ task evaluation accuracy is substantially weakened in 
occupations predominantly populated by opposite-gender workers, which impose negative 
wage effects on workers in subordinate groups.  Therefore, imposing a gender quota in 
managerial positions is not an elixir to address workplace gender wage disparities. 7 Rather, 
if female managers are not working coordinately with other male staff, the benefit of 
diversity may be lost. In this sense, to achieve workplace gender equality, policies are also 
needed to increase the information share and network building within and between firm 
hierarchies, which characteristics help to create a diverse and inclusive workplace 
environment.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 presents the theoretical model 
and empirically testable predictions. Section 1.3 introduces the data and how the key 
measurements are defined and constructed, followed by statistical descriptions of main 
variables. Section 1.4 offers main empirical results. Section 1.5 presents robustness checks 
and discusses other possible mechanisms. Section 1.6 summarizes the results and discusses 
related implications.  
1.2 Theoretical Model  
This section presents a theoretical model in supportive of the main argument in this 
study. The theoretical model in this study extends the models in Phelps (1972), Oettinger 
(1996) and Cornell and Welch (1996) by considering the gender of supervisor, information 
                                                          
7 The finding in this present study also resonates with the findings in Marianne et al (2014), which suggests 
that the “quotas of female managers” has no statistically significant effect on gender wage gap in Norway.  
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distortion conditioning on occupational gender composition, as well as workers’ skill 
mismatch. This section only presents how the empirically testable implications are derived 
from the theoretical model. For details of proofs, please refer to the Appendix-B.  
 Assume a group of risk-neutral workers, each belonging to one gender type i 
(male/female, i = 𝑓, 𝑚 ). Each worker is endowed with a set of skill attainments 
unobservable to supervisors. I assume that workers’ skill attainments are denoted as A୧, 
and the distribution is identical to males and females.   
 Based on the share of female workers (p), occupations can be divided into two types 
(k = f, m). Occupations with larger share of female workers (p > 0.5) are predominantly 
female occupations, and otherwise, predominantly male occupations (p < 0.5) .  Each 
occupation has a set of skill requirements R୩.  R୩~𝑁(𝑅, 𝜎ோଶ)   In each occupation, there are 
two types of risk neutral supervisors, male and female(𝑗 = 𝑓, 𝑚). The share of female 
supervisors in occupation 𝑘 is denoted as 𝜋௞.   
 This model changes the assumption in usual statistical discrimination models (e.g. 
Phelps 1972, Cornell and Welch 1996) in the following two ways.   
            (1) Assumptions about skill mismatch and productivity. This model assumes that 
workers’ productivity 𝑢௜ in a filled vacancy depends on how their skills are matched to the 
occupational requirements. This builds upon a long list of literature suggesting that worker-
job match plays an important role in determining workers’ productivity (Jovanovic, 1979; 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Kalleberg 2008; Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2015; Guvenen 
et al. 2016). Skill mismatch (either over-match or under-match) generates negative 
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productivity8. In usual statistical discrimination models, expected productivities depend 
only on workers’ skill attainments, which ignores the importance of match-specific 9 
productivity.  
𝑢௜ =  f(A୧, R୩) = 𝑅௞ − |𝑅௞ − 𝐴௜|, 
where 𝑄௜ = |𝑅௞ − 𝐴௜| denotes the extent of skill mismatch. The productivity is maximized 
when  𝑄௜ = 0 .The productivity 𝑢௜  can be normalized to follow a normal 
distribution 𝑢௜~𝑁(𝑚, 𝜂ଶ), which is identical for men and women.  
           (2) Assumptions about supervisors’ information noise. To evaluate workers’ 
productivity 𝑢௜,௞ in a job vacancy (a.k.a., worker-job match), supervisors draw a set of 
information 𝐼௜,௞
௝  about workers’ skill attainments10  and occupational requirements11.  
𝐼௜,௞
௝ = 𝑢௜,௞ + 𝜖௜,௞
௝ , 
where   𝜖௜,௞
௝  denotes the information noise for supervisor of gender  j , who evaluates 
productivity for worker of gender i in occupation k. In this model, supervisors are assumed 
to draw more accurate information in occupations with larger share of same-gender 
                                                          
8 It is easy to understand that when workers’ skill attainments fall short of occupational requirements, their 
productivity will be lower than the productivity if they were well-matched. What needs to be explained here 
is that over-qualification may also lower workers’ productivity. Literature in industrial psychology indicates 
that overqualified workers tend to be more dissatisfied with their jobs, exhibit more absenteeism, turnover 
and even sabotage behavior (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Quinn and Shepard, 1974; Quinn and Mandilovitch, 
1975; Chevalier, 2003, Green and McIntosh, 2007, and Green and Zhu, 2010), which lead to reduced work 
effort, inflicting additional cost of production beyond the cost of workers’ compensation. Tsang and Levin 
(1985) develop a model that formally establishes the negative relationship between over-qualification and 
productivity (Tsang, 1984; Tsang and Levin, 1985; Guvenen et al. 2016).  
9 In Oettinger (1996), workers’ productivity is also assumed to be specific to different worker-supervisor 
matches. In this study, “match-specific” refers to how workers’ skill attainments are matched to occupational 
requirements.  
10 Signals of workers’ skill attainments have been well discussed in the literature of statistical discrimination. 
It involves results from interviews, pre-hiring tests on various skills, reference letters, etc.  
11  Information related to occupational requirements refers to information about firms’ organizational 
structure, as well as any important and relevant conditions in the marketplace and other external factors that 
must be considered in the staffing decision.   
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workers12. That is,  𝜖௜௠~𝑁(0, 𝑝ଶ𝜎ଶ) , 𝜖௜
௙~𝑁(0, (1 − 𝑝)ଶ𝜎ଶ). Also, for simplicity, it is 
assumed that  𝜖௜,௞
௝  and 𝜖௜,௞
௝  are independent variables.   
1.2.1 Without job changes 
For simplicity, I first consider a situation in which there’s no job changes, and in 
section 2.2, I consider a situation with job changes. In this world, each worker lives for 
three stages:  
Stage 0: A worker of gender i observes the gender composition of supervisors 
π୩ and workers p୩ in each occupation. Based on this information, he/she applies for one 
type of occupation.  
Stage 1: Supervisors draw information about workers’ skill attainments and 
occupational requirements. Workers are recruited based on their expected productivity, and 
they are paid based on the “starting wage offers” 13.  Following Oettinger (1996), workers’ 
starting-wage offer is a weighted sum of the expected productivity and the true productivity:  
𝑤௜,௞,ଵ
௝ = 𝜃𝑢ప,௞
ఫ෢ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௜,௞, 
where 𝜃 denotes the weight on workers’ expected productivity14. When 𝜃 = 0, workers 
receive a piece-rate wage, which depends solely on the realized productivity.   
                                                          
12 The assumption of 𝜖௜,௞
௝  is different from those in usual statistical discrimination models. For example, in 
Phelps (1972) and Oettinger (1996), employers receive less accurate signal of skill attainments for workers 
from the minority groups than workers from the majority groups. In Cornell and Welch (1996) and Fadlon 
(2010), the information is noisier for workers matched to supervisors in different culture groups. In our study, 
however, the source of information bias comes from the gender interaction across firms’ hierarchies.  
13 In stage 1, all workers are new to the supervisors. The wage offers they receive are starting wage offers. 
The starting wage is a weighted sum of workers’ expected productivity and the true productivity. In stage 2, 
only workers who move to new supervisors are offered the starting wage contracts. 
14 For simplicity and without loss of generality, 𝜃 is assumed to be the same for male and female workers 
across stages 1 and 2. However, this model also allows 𝜃 to be different between men and women, and in 
different time periods. 
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Stage 2: Each worker’s true productivity in stage 1’s occupation 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ is revealed 
to supervisors, and to themselves. Workers’ wages in this stage are determined by their 
true productivity.  
𝑤௜,௞,ଶ
௝ = 𝑢௜,௞ 
(1) Workers’ expected productivity and skill mismatch 
At the recruiting stage, the expected productivity for type 𝑖  workers with 
supervisor j in occupation k is:  
𝑢ప,௞
ఫ෢ ≡ 𝐸൫𝑢௜,௞ห𝐼௜,௞
௝ ൯ = ൫𝜌௞
௝൯
ଶ
𝐼௜,௞
௝ + [1 − ൫𝜌௞
௝൯
ଶ
]𝑚,  
Where for male supervisor,  𝜌௞ ௠ =
ఎమ
ఎమା௣ೖ
మఙమ
 ; for female supervisors, 𝜌௞
௙ = ఎ
మ
ఎమା(ଵି௣ೖ)మఙమ
.                                       
 It is easy to show that in female predominant occupations, female supervisors put 
higher weights on workers’ true productivity and male supervisors put higher weights on 
workers’ signal; in male-predominant occupations, male supervisors put higher weights on 
workers’ true productivity and female supervisors put higher weights on workers’ signal. 
 Recall that to maximize workers’ productivity, supervisors only hire workers 
whose skill attainments are perfectly matched to occupational requirements ( 𝑄ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣ =
ห𝑅௞,ଵ
௝ − 𝐴௜ห = 0 ). Therefore, worker 𝑖  will receive wage offers from supervisor j in 
occupations with requirements 𝑅௞,ଵ
௝ = 𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣  .  
            For workers with skill attainments  A୧ , the average extent of skill mismatch if 
working with a female supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) = ൣ1 − (𝜌௞
௙)ଶ൧|𝑚 − A୧|. The average extent 
of skill mismatch if working with a male supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ) = [1 − (𝜌௞௠)ଶ]|𝑚 − A୧|.   
Proposition 1: 
  
10 
 
For each worker, the extent of skill mismatch depends on gender of supervisor and 
occupational gender composition: 1) In female-predominant occupations, a worker has 
smaller extent of skill mismatch if matched to a female supervisor, compared to the 
situation if matched to a male supervisor. 2) In male-predominant occupations, a worker 
has smaller extent of skill mismatch if matched to a male supervisor, compared to the 
situation if matched to a female supervisor. 
(2) Workers’ wages in stage 1 
When workers’ true productivities are not revealed, the average wages for female 
workers with female supervisors in predominantly female occupation is 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ
௙ ൯ =
𝜃𝑢௙,௙,ଵ
௙෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵ = 𝑚. The average wages for female workers with male supervisors 
in predominantly female occupation is: 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ௠ ൯ = θ𝑢௙,௙,ଵ௠෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵ = 𝑚. Thus, 
we have  𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ௠ ൯ . Similarly, we can obtain that  E൫𝑤௙,௠,ଵ
௙ ൯ =
𝐸൫𝑤௙,௠,ଵ௠ ൯, 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଵ௠ ൯  and 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଵ௠ ൯. Even though workers’ 
skill attainments are matched disparately to occupations at the entry of labor market, skill 
mismatch does not immediately translate to the average wage differences.  
Proposition 2: 
Initially, the gender of supervisors has no effects on workers’ wages, regardless of 
occupational gender composition.  
(3) Workers’ wages in stage 2 
 In stage 2, workers’ true productivities are revealed. Since there’s no job changes 
at this stage, workers’ wages are determined by the true productivity, which depends on 
their skill match qualities.  
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𝑤௜,௞,ଶ
௝ = 𝑢௜,௞ = 𝑅௞ − 𝑄௜,௞
௝  
Thus, for female workers with skill attainment A, working with male supervisors 
in predominantly female occupation generates an average stage-2 wage as: 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଶ௠ ൯ =
𝐸(𝑅௙ − 𝑄௙,௙௠ ) = 𝑅 − ൣ1 − (𝜌௙௠)ଶ൧|𝑚 − 𝐴| , but working with female supervisors in 
predominantly female occupation generates an average stage-2 wage as:  ൫𝑤௙,௙,ଶ
௙ ൯ =
𝐸(𝑅௙ − 𝑄௙,௙
௙ ) = 𝑅 − ൣ1 − (𝜌௙
௙)ଶ൧|𝑚 − 𝐴|. It is easy to show that 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଶ௠ ൯ < 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଶ
௙ ൯. 
Similarly, 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௠,ଶ௠ ൯ > 𝐸൫𝑤௙,௠,ଶ
௙ ൯, 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଶ௠ ൯ < 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଶ
௙ ൯, 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଶ௠ ൯ < 𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଶ
௙ ൯. As 
workers’ true productivities reveal, wage losses associated with skill-mismatch leads to 
different wage earnings for supervisor-worker gender match in different occupations.  
Proposition 3:  
As workers’ occupational tenure accumulates, in female-predominant occupations, 
workers with female supervisors earn higher wages on average compared to workers with 
male supervisors; in male-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors earn 
lower wages on average compared to workers with male supervisors.  
1.2.2 With job changes 
The model in section 2.1 assumes that once hired, workers stick to the same 
supervisor in a same occupation. However, this assumption is somewhat counter intuitive: 
workers with greater skill mismatch would suffer greater wage declines if they choose to 
stay with the old supervisors. Intuitively, they tend to change jobs and take advantage of 
new supervisors’ information bias to avoid wage decline in stage 2. Thus, in this section, I 
consider job changes in stage 2.   
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Assume each worker receives a wage offer from a new supervisor15 in stage 2.  
Workers make the decision of whether to stay or to move. Stayers are paid based on their 
true productivity, but movers are paid based on the “starting wage offer” issued by the new 
supervisor (see wage schedules below).  Table 1.1 summarizes cases of mobility decisions.   
𝑤௜,௞,ଶ
௝ = ൝
𝑢௜,௞,ଵ, 𝑖𝑓  𝑢௜,௞,ଵ ≥  𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣    (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠),      
𝜃𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௜,௞,ଶ,    𝑢௜,௞,ଵ <  𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣    (𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠)     
 
 (1) Inter-period wage gains conditioning on mobility decisions 
The inter-period wage gains conditioning on the decision of “stay” is:  ∆w୧,୩ =
w୧,୩,ଵ
୨ − w୧,୩,ଶ
୨ =  𝜃(𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ). The expectation of inter-period wage gains for a stayer 
is:  
𝜋௞ × 𝐸 ቀ𝜃 ቀ𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
௙෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵቁ ቚ𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
௙෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ ≤ 0ቁ + (1 − 𝜋௞) ×
𝐸൫𝜃൫𝑢ప,௞,ଵ௠෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ൯ห𝑢ప,௞,ଶ௠෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ ≤ 0൯  
Workers decide to move if 𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ > 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ. For movers, the inter-period wage gains 
conditioning on moving is:  ∆w୧,୩ = w୧,୩,ଵ
୨ − w୧,୩,ଶ
୨ =  𝜃 ቀ𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣ − 𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ ቁ + (1 −
θ)(𝑢௜,௞,ଵ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଶ), that is, E [𝜃 ቀ𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣ − 𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ ቁ + (1 − θ)(𝑢௜,௞,ଵ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଶ)|𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ − 𝑢௜,௞,ଵ >
0]. The inter-period wage gains conditioning on workers’ mobility decision summarized 
in Table 1.2, based on which two propositions can be derived. 
Proposition 4: 
                                                          
15 For simplicity, we assume workers do not receive offers from occupations of different gender type at stage 
2.  For instance, female workers working in predominantly female occupations only receives new wage offers 
from supervisors in predominantly female occupations. This assumption is justified since we believe that the 
occupational requirements differ a lot between the predominantly female occupations and predominantly 
male occupations. Workers’ skill attainments have been acquired at the time they decide to apply for either 
male or female occupations.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a worker changes occupation type at later career 
stages. However, different task assignments imply that the true productivity may vary for the same worker 
in different stages ൫u୧,୩,ଵ ≠ u୧,୩,ଶ൯. 
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(i) Stayers with the female supervisors obtain lower inter-period wage gains 
compared to stayers with the male supervisors, in occupations with larger proportion of 
female workers. (ii) Stayers with the female supervisors obtain higher inter-period wage 
gains compared to stayers with the male supervisors, in occupations with larger proportion 
of male workers.  
Proposition 5: 
In female-predominant occupations, movers with female supervisors in both stages 
earn the highest inter-period wage gains; movers with male supervisors in both stages earn 
the lowest inter-period wage gains; other movers earn inter-period wage gains in between. 
The opposite applies to male-predominant occupations.  
 (2) Conditional expectation of the stage-2 wage and returns to experience 
For stayers, the conditional expectation of second period wage for stayers is: 
𝜋௞𝐸 ቀ𝑢௜,௞,ଵቚ 𝑢௜,௞.ଵ − 𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
௙෣ > 0ቁ + (1 − 𝜋௞)𝐸൫𝑢௜,௞,ଵห 𝑢௜,௞.ଵ − 𝑢ప,௞,ଶ௠෣ > 0൯. For movers, the 
conditional expectation of the second-period wage for movers is: 
𝐸 ቀ𝜃𝑢ప,௞,ଶ
ఫ෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௜,௞,ଶቚ 𝑢௜,௞.ଵ − 𝑢ప,௞,ଶෟ < 0ቁ . The average second-period wages 
conditioning on workers’ mobility are summarized in Table 1.3. From stage 1 to stage 2, 
workers gain 1 years of labor market experience.  Proposition 6 characterizes the 
differences in return to experience.  
Proposition 6: 
(i) Stayers’ return to one-year experience generates higher return than movers’ one-
year experience. (ii) In female-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors 
have higher return to experience, compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. In 
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male predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors have lower return to 
experience, compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. 
(3) Unconditional Wage Expectation in Stage 2. 
The stage-2 unconditional wage expectations are summarized in Table 1.4. 
Supervisors’ wage effects emerge and enlarge as workers’ experience accumulates.  
Proposition 7: 
As experience accumulates, (i) in female-predominant occupations, workers with 
female supervisors receive higher wages on average, compared to workers with male 
supervisors; (ii) in male-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors 
receive lower wages on average, compared to workers with male supervisors. 
Since workers receive the same average wages at stage 1, therefore, their life-time expected 
wages depend on wage expectations at stage 2. Compared to their counterparts with 
opposite gender supervisors, workers with female supervisors earn higher expected life-
time earnings in predominantly female, but they earn less in predominantly male 
occupations.   
1.2.4 Summary of empirically testable predictions: 
The above theoretical predictions lead to the following empirically testable 
implications. 
1. In predominantly female occupations, a worker has smaller extent of skill mismatch 
with a female supervisor, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor. In 
predominantly male occupations, a worker has greater extent of skill mismatch with 
a female supervisor, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor.  
2. Initially, there is no wage effects associated with supervisors-worker gender match. 
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3. As workers’ experience accumulates, workers with same-gender supervisors earn 
higher wages on average compared to workers with opposite-gender supervisors, 
in occupation with larger share of same-gender workers.  
4. In predominantly female occupations, stayers with female supervisors have lower 
average wage growth rates, compared to movers with female supervisors; movers 
with the male supervisors have lower wage growth rate, compared to movers with 
female supervisors. The opposite is true in predominantly male occupations. 
5. In predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors have higher 
return to experience. In predominantly male occupations, workers with female 
supervisors have lower return to experience.   
1.3 Data   
1.3.1 NLSY97 data  
The empirical tests are based on the data from National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 97 (NLSY97)16, which contains a nationally representative panel of youth who were 
aged 12-16 as of December 1996. The NLSY97 data has the following major advantages. 
First, it covers workers in early career stages, which allows us to examine how the 
supervisors’ wage effects emerge and enlarge, starting from the labor market entry. Second, 
the data contains detailed information on workers’ working history, which enables us to 
construct accurate measures on workers’ job tenure, occupation tenure and labor market 
experience17.  Third, the data includes information about the gender of a workers’ direct 
                                                          
16 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort, 
1997-2011 (rounds 1-15). Produced by the National Opinion Research Center, the University of Chicago and 
distributed by the Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH: 2013. 
17 In this study, job tenure is defined as number of years that individual respondent works for the same 
employer. The same employer is identified in NLSY 97 data with the same “employer unique id”. Occupation 
tenure is defined as number of years that individual respondent works in a typical 3-digit occ1990dd 
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supervisor from 1997-2008, with which I can match respondents’ gender with the gender 
of their direct supervisors. In addition, NLSY data allows me to control for cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills of workers across several dimensions, using the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores and the Big 5 Personality Scale. These 
measures are unavailable in other panel data sets of a similar nature. These advantages 
make NLSY97 data suitable for this study.  
As our research interest focuses only on workers’ wage earnings, respondents who 
are self-employed, serving in military, as well as over-sampled Hispanic or Latino and 
Black people are excluded. I also exclude those who work full-time in the first year they 
were observed, since it is impossible to identify the point of labor market entry for these 
people.  Table 1.5 presents the sample selection process for this study.  
The wage is measured using workers’ real hourly wage payment in 2002’s dollar 
value. Samples with missing information on hourly payment, or reporting hourly wages 
less than $1 or over $100018 are excluded. After excluded those with missing information 
on any of the variables used in the analysis, our main sample comprises 33150 person-year 
observations over 11 waves of the survey (1997-2008).   
The NLSY97’s occupations are coded by the 2002 Census Occupational 
Classification (COC)19. I mapped these occupational codes using a unified code so that I 
                                                          
occupation. Cumulative labor market experience is defined as cumulative number of years that individual 
respondents spent working full-time, starting from the labor market entry.  
18 The hourly payment information in NLSY97 also contains entry errors, to avoid this potential problem, we 
trace individual workers’ wage growth rate. Those having a more than 400% wage growth rate in one year 
followed by an 80% wage decline the next year are identified as “mistyped”. In the sample, there’re 16 
observations’ wage information are labeled as “mistyped”. These wage observations are adjusted to match 
the record in other years.   
19 NLSY97Attachment 1: Census Industrial & Occupational Classification Codes 
(https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/attachment-1-
census-industrial), time of visiting Aug. 1st , 2016 
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can merge the O*NET occupational knowledge, skills and ability (KSA) requirements and 
female employment rates obtained from ACS data to our sample. The 2002 COC were first 
converted to 2000 COC (occ2000) and then mapped to the 3-digit occupation code 
occ1990dd 20  suggested in Dorn (2009), using the crosswalks downloaded from 
http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015 21. After mapping, the occupations are 
divided into 6 aggregate occupation groups 22  using do-file downloaded from 
http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015, as are used in Autor and Dorn (2013).  
            Table 1.6 provides basic descriptive statistics for the NLSY97 sample.  
1.3.2 Constructing skill mismatch measurement  
This study defines an individual workers’ skill mismatch as the discrepancies 
between one’s premarket skill attainments and the requirements of the occupations in 
which they are employed. 23  This skill mismatch measurement goes beyond one’s 
                                                          
20 According to Dorn (2009), the “occ1990dd” system provides a new unified occupational category system 
containing 330 occupation codes, which helps constructing “a balanced panel of occupations covering the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses and the 2005 ACS” (Dorn 2009, p122). Although there’s another cross work 
provided by Meyer and Osborne (2005) with 386 “occ1990” occupation codes, one limitation with this code 
system is, according to Dorn (2009, p122), “the occupation panel is unbalanced”. “occ1990dd” system is also 
widely used in recent literature on skill and occupations, such as Autor (2010), Autor and Dorn (2013), Shim 
and Yang (2016) etc. In view of these, this study chooses “occ1990dd” code system to obtain a time-
consistent and balanced occupation panel.   
21 When mapping the 2000 COC code to occ1990dd, 11 occupations are not worked by NLSY97 respondents, 
21 occupations cannot be mapped to occ1990dd, and 2 occupations are miscoded. Depending on Dorn (2009), 
we assigned the approximate 1990dd code to the un-mapped 21 Census 2000 occupations to minimize 
observation loss. Details of the code-matching are available upon request. 
22 The 6 aggregated occupation groups are: (1) Managers/professionals/ technicians/finance/public safety 
occupations; (2) administrative support and retail sales occupations; (3) low-skill services; (4) precision 
production and craft occupations; (5) machine operators, assemblers and inspectors; (6) 
transportation/construction/mechanics/mining/agricultural occupations.   
23 A review of literature suggests that measurements of skill mismatch are constructed in following ways, 
each bares some disadvantages. First, dummies indicating self-reported mismatch (Hersch 1991), which may 
be biased when respondents have misperception of their situations of skill mismatch. Second, mismatch 
measurements defined as deviations from the average (or median) level of education (or skill intensity) in 
one’s occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo 1989). This measurement is usually used in the absence of 
occupational skill requirement data, which provides more objective indicators than self-reported mismatch 
dummies. However, this measurement tends to be biased since the average educational/skill level in a 
particular occupation may be affected by the distribution of skill mismatch in this occupation. For instance, 
the average level of education (skill attainment) in an occupation may be biased upwards if most of workers 
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educational attainments and reveal more in-depth views on the extent and consequences of 
multi-dimensional skill mismatch even for individuals with the same level of education.  
            In linking the skill supply side (viz. workers’ endowments) with the demand side 
(viz. occupational requirements), I exploit the tools developed by the Career Exploration 
Program. The ASVAB Career Exploration Program is administered by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) with a view to helping ASVAB participants identify and explore suitable 
career possibilities in the private, public, or military sectors. About 80 percent of the 
NLSY97 sample participated in the computer adaptive test of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB).24 
Four categories of skills are included in this study: Mathematical, Verbal, 
Science/Technological/Mechanical (STM) and Social skills.  For the first three skills, I 
construct composite measures using percentile ranks on selected ASVAB subtests 25 . 
Specifically, for verbal skills I use the percentile scores on Word Knowledge and 
Paragraph Comprehension, for mathematical skills the scores on Arithmetic Reasoning 
and Mathematical Knowledge, and for STM skills the scores on General Science, 
Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information. 26  Next, using the weights 
                                                          
in this occupation are over-qualified. The opposite situation applies to the case when most of workers in this 
occupation are under-matched. 
24 For details of the administration of the CAT-ASVAB tests, the reader is referred to the NLSY97 web pages: 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/education/administration-cat-asvab-0.  
25 CAT-ASVAB test measures respondents’ knowledge and skills through the following subtests: Arithmetic 
Reasoning, Assembling Objects, Auto Information, Coding Speed, Electronics Information, General Science, 
Mathematics Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, Numerical Operations, Paragraph Comprehension, 
Shop Information, Word Knowledge. For the explanation of each sub-tests and the score calculation, please 
refer to the Appendix 10 of NLSY97: Administration and Scoring of the CAT-ASVAB 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/appendix-10-
cat-asvab-scores. 
26 This approach is similar to that used by Guvenen et al. (2016) other than for the inclusion of STM scores. 
There is no consensus in the literature on construction of the ability measures, and even though almost all 
studies utilize ASVAB test scores, they select different ability dimensions or different subtests for 
measurement of these dimensions. We have checked the robustness of our results to variation in 
measurements, such as the exclusion of STM skills by Guvenen et al. (2016) and the restriction of ASVAB 
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provided by the NLS,27 I create a comparable composite skills measure from these subtest 
scores for each NLSY respondent. I then standardize these skill percentile ranks to be 
between 0 and 1. For the social skill measurement, I use two questions on Extroversion and 
two questions on Conscientiousness in the Big 5 Personality Scale to construct a social 
skill rank, following Deming (2017a). I download the standardized measurements from 
Deming’s (2017b) data file, and then converted the scores to percentile ranks for NLSY97 
respondents.               
In this study, each occupation is considered as a combination of KSAs (Knowledge, 
Skills and Ability) it requires. For each of the ASVAB math/verbal and STM test scores, 
there is a corresponding occupational task in O*NET database which utilizes that KSA. 28 
This mapping is provided in Appendix C. After merging the O*NET KSA extracts to 
NLSY97, I calculated the percentile rank scores of occupational math/verbal/STM) 
requirements. For each of the three-dimension ASVAB categories, I created an O*NET 
analog by averaging the corresponding descriptors in each category. After that, I convert 
the three-dimension O*NET occupational requirements into percentile ranks among 
occupations.   
The extent of skill-mismatch is measured as the absolute value of the differences 
between one’s percentile-rank scores of skill endowments and the percentile-rank scores 
of corresponding occupational requirements. Specifically, let 𝐴௜௝ represents individual i’s 
percentile-rank-scores in ASVAB test for skill endowment j (j denotes mathematics, verbal, 
                                                          
measured abilities to cognitive and manual by Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) who also analyze mismatch by 
separate ability dimensions as opposed the use of an aggregate measure.  
27 We thank the NLS program staff for their help in this connection.  
28 I use the 2007 version of the O*NET database, after Hirsh and Manzella (2015). We are indebted to Barry 
Hirsch for kindly providing these data. 
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as well as STM and social skills). Recall that  𝐴௜௝ does not vary by year or an individual’s 
occupation. Let 𝑅௜௝௞௬denotes an individual i’s O*NET occupational requirements for skill 
j, in occupation k, in year y. Individuals’ ASVAB scores are mapped to O*NET 
occupational requirements based on the method developed by the Department of Defense 
(DOD) (see Appendix C for details). The degree of skill mismatch for individual i for skill 
j, in year y and occupation k is: 
Q୧୨୩୷ = |𝐴௜௝ − 𝑅௜௝௞௬|. 
The lower the value of Q, the better the skill is matched. I scaled each dimension 
of Q to have a standard deviation of 1.  
Table 1.7 provides a description of mismatch measures used in this study, by the 
gender of supervisor and occupational gender composition. Statistics show that workers 
have greater amount of skill mismatch in predominantly female occupations, compared to 
their counterparts in predominantly male occupations. Moreover, for most of the cases in 
our sample, workers have less extent of skill mismatch with same-gender supervisors in 
occupations populated by same-gender workers.  
1.3.3 Measurement of jobs’ gender-type: occupational share of female workers 
The occupational gender composition (FEM) is measured using the ratio of female 
workers to the sum of total workers in an occ1990dd occupation. The FEM measurements 
are generated from the American Community Survey (ACS) data from 1997-200829. The 
occupations are obtained in a simplified version of occ1990 codes used by IPUMS and I 
use the crosswalk provided by IPUMs to map them into the standard occ1990 codes.  Then 
                                                          
29 The data is downloaded from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS): Steven Ruggles, Katie 
Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: 
Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015. http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0. 
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I use Dorn’s crosswalk to obtain the FEM in each occ1990dd occupations and merge them 
to the main NLSY97 data set.  
1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Supervisors’ wage effects conditioning on occupational gender composition  
The first motivation figure indicates that workers with female supervisors earn 
higher wages than they would be expected in predominantly female occupations and lower 
wages in predominantly male occupations, compared to their counterparts with male 
supervisors. This section tests whether this stylized pattern holds empirically. The 
estimation results are reported in Tables 1.8A and 1.8B.  
Sicilian and Grossberg (2014)’s research argues that no significant wage effects are 
associated with the gender of supervisor when controlling for occupational gender 
composition and individual worker’s fixed effect. To be comparable to this previous study, 
Table 1.8A reports the estimation results when the “female supervisor” dummy is not 
interacted with occupational gender compositions.  When no other controls are added in 
the OLS regression (Columns labeled [1]), female supervisor is associated with a 6% wage 
loss on average. The magnitude of wage loss reduces to 5% when individuals’ demographic 
variables are controlled for in the “standard” specifications, and to 1% when occupational 
gender compositions and occupation-related variables are controlled for in the “full” 
specification. When fixed effect models are used to control for workers’ unobserved 
characteristics, this negative wage effect shrinks to less than 1% in the “standard” 
specification, and it becomes insignificant in the “full” specification. This pattern is 
consistent with the pattern suggested by Sicilian and Grossberg (2014). 
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However, a different picture unfolds when the supervisor’s wage effects are 
examined conditioning on occupational gender composition. The estimations are reported 
in Table 1.8B.  When no other controls are added, the OLS regression suggests that workers 
with female supervisors in predominantly male occupations are associated with certain 
wage loss, but the magnitude of wage loss reduces as the proportion of female workers 
increases. In predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors earn 
higher wages on average compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. This pattern 
remains consistent when the full set of control variables are included and workers’ fixed 
effect model are used. Based on the fixed effect model estimation with the full set of control 
variables. In occupations where female workers only accounts for 5% of the workforce, a 
worker with female supervisors suffers 4% wage penalty on average, compared to their 
counterparts with male supervisors. In occupations where female workers accounts for 95% 
of the labor force, a worker with female supervisors earn 3.6 % wage premium on average, 
compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. In occupations with even share of 
male and female workers, there’s no significant wage difference between workers with 
female supervisors and those with male ones.   
Considering that the gender of supervisor may affect workers’ match quality in 
current job, and better match quality may be correlated to a longer tenure with 
employer/occupation and longer labor market experience. Therefore, the tenure and 
experience measurements may be endogenous. Following Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and 
Guvenen et al. (2016), I instrument individuals’ employer/ occupational tenure/total 
experience with their relative position in the tenure hierarchy with a given employer or 
occupation, controlling for the possibility of multiple spells of employment with the same 
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employer or in the same occupation.30 The IV-fixed effect estimations are reported in Table 
1.8B, and there’s no significant changes in terms of sign or magnitude.   
Previous research emphasizes that only men benefit from their same-gender 
supervisor, and the occupational share of female workers fully explains the negative 
association between women’s wages and female supervisors. Different from these 
arguments, the empirical findings in this section suggests that working with female 
supervisors is associated with wage premium in predominantly female occupations, but it 
is associated with wage loss in predominantly male occupations. Why is this? Possible 
mechanisms are explored empirically in the sections that follow.  
1.4.2 Explaining the supervisors’ wage effects 
(1) The gender of supervisors and occupational skill mismatch 
One of the possible mechanisms, as is proposed in the theoretical model, is that 
female supervisors are less affected by information distortion while recruiting workers in 
predominantly female occupations, leading to better skill match qualities for their 
subordinates (Figure 1.2). This section presents tests on whether this patter holds 
empirically. The results are reported in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. 
Table 1.9 checks how supervisors’ gender affects the size of skill mismatch for their 
subordinates, conditioning on occupational gender composition. The dependent variable is 
                                                          
30  𝐼𝑉௘௠௣ = 𝑇௘௠௣ − 𝑇௘௠௣തതതതതത  and 𝐼𝑉௢௖௖ = 𝑇௢௖௖ − 𝑇௢௖௖തതതതത, where 𝑇௘௠௣തതതതതത is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with 
the same employer 𝑘 and  𝑇௢௖௖തതതതത is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with the same occupation j. 𝑇௘௠௣തതതതതത =
ଵ
்
∑ 𝑇௘௠௣௜,௞,௧
்
௧ୀଵ , where 𝑇 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same employer.  
𝑇௢௖௖തതതതത =
ଵ
ே
∑ 𝑇௢௖௖ ௜,௝,௧
ே
௧ୀଵ , where 𝑁 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same 
occupation j. Total experience is also instrumented in the same way, with an instrument 𝐼𝑉௘௫௣ = 𝑇௘௫௣ − 𝑇௘௫௣തതതതത, 
where 𝑇௘௫௣തതതതത is the average duration that individual 𝑖 stays in the labor market 𝑇௘௫௣തതതതത =
ଵ
ௌ
∑ 𝑇௘௫௣௜,௝,௧
ௌ
௧ୀଵ , where 𝑆 
is the total number of spells that an individual is observed to be in the labor market. 
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the standardized total amount of mismatch. We see that, workers with female supervisors 
are 5%-6% standard deviation more mismatched in all-male occupations compared to their 
counterparts with male supervisors, but they are 5-6% standard deviation less mismatched 
in all-female occupations. This pattern is highly in-line with our theoretical predictions. 
The IV-fixed effect estimations are reported in Columns (3), and there’s no significant 
changes in terms of sign or magnitude.   
As are presented in Table 1.10, workers with female supervisors are more likely to 
be both overqualified and under-qualified in predominantly male occupations, but they are 
less likely to be overqualified or under-qualified in predominantly female occupations.  
Summing up the findings in Tables 1.9 and 1.10, empirical evidence generally 
supports the theoretical predictions: female supervisors lead to better skill match for their 
subordinates in occupations with greater proportion of female workers; workers with 
female supervisors suffer from greater extent of skill mismatch in predominantly male 
occupations. Differences in skill match qualities affect workers’ true productivities, which 
then contributes to the observed wage patterns.  
(2)  Supervisors’ wage effects along workers’ career path  
As is indicated in our theoretical model, if disparities in skill match quality is the 
underlying mechanism that leads to the observed supervisors’ wage effects, we may expect 
to see the following predictions hold empirically: (1) the gender of supervisors have no 
significant wage effects at early career stages, but the effects emerge as workers’ 
experience accumulates. (2) A worker’s return to job mobility decision and to experience 
is affected by the gender of his/her supervisor and occupational gender composition. This 
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section examines these predictions by exploring supervisors’ wage effects along workers’ 
career paths.   
First, we explore how the supervisors’ wage effects develop as workers' labor 
market experience accumulates. Table 1.11 reports the estimated coefficients of "female 
supervisor" and its interaction term with FEM for a subsample31 of individual with "less 
than 3 year" "3-6 years" "more than 6 years" of labor market experience. The coefficients 
are estimated using the fixed-effect model and IV-fixed effect model including the full set 
of control variables. The estimated female supervisors’ wage effects and its interaction 
term with FEM is statistically insignificant for workers at the immediate entry into the 
labor market. These findings generally support one of the theoretical predictions: “At the 
entry of labor market, there should be no wage gap on average between individuals with 
same-gender supervisor and those with opposite-gender supervisor, ceteris paribus.” 
As workers’ experience accumulates, the supervisors’ wage effects emerge and 
remain the same pattern as are described above. The magnitude of supervisors’ wage 
effects also increases as workers’ experience accumulates. This generally support the 
theoretical prediction: “As workers’ labor market experience accumulates, the average 
wage gap may emerge for workers with same-gender supervisor and those with opposite-
gender supervisor, ceteris paribus.” 
Table 1.12 reports the estimation on differences in return to job-motilities. The 
signs of coefficients are consistent with theoretical predictions: compared to stayers with 
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, movers with female supervisors 
                                                          
31 Following Oettinger (1996), the subsample contains individuals who have 3 consecutive years of full-time 
working experience in the main job. The subsample also rejects individuals who work full-time in the first 
year in which they were observed.  
  
26 
 
in these occupations have higher wage growth rate; in predominantly female occupations, 
compared to movers with male supervisors, movers with female supervisors have higher 
wage growth rate. In predominantly male occupations, however, movers with female 
supervisors receive the lowest wage growth rate.  
Table 1.13 examines the last group of theoretical predictions on the return to labor 
market experience. The return to one-year labor market experience is higher for those with 
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, but it is lower for those with 
female supervisors in predominantly male occupations. This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that “women with male supervisors have higher return to 
occupational tenure than women with female supervisors in occupations with smaller 
proportion of female workers”.   
1.5 Robustness Checks: other mechanisms? 
In addition to the information bias, two other mechanisms may also lead to the 
afore-mentioned supervisors’ wage effects, which will be discussed respectively in this 
section.  
1.5.1 Whether the same-gender supervisor wage effects are due to skill sorting?  
It is likely that the observed wage effects capture the gender skill sorting across 
occupations, rather than the bias in information. For instance, it is possible that female 
supervisors are more capable in predominantly female occupations, so that they are 
associated with positions with higher skill requirements. Therefore, higher average wages 
for workers with female supervisors in predominantly female occupations may be 
attributable to higher occupational skill requirements. The same argument may apply to 
male supervisors in predominantly male occupations. If these arguments hold, then 
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empirically, we may expect to see the following two patterns: (i) In predominantly female 
occupations, those with positions of higher skill requirements are more likely to work with 
female supervisors; in predominantly male occupations, those with positions of higher skill 
requirements are more likely to work with male supervisors. (ii) Initially, the stylized wage 
effects should be prominent. However, as are shown above, workers just enter the labor 
market, supervisors’ wage effects are not prominent, which does not support pattern (i). As 
are shown in Table 1.14, the probability of working with a female supervisor does not 
significantly associated with the occupational skill requirements in predominantly female 
occupations; while in predominantly male occupations, female supervisors are even 
associated with positions of higher skill requirements. This indicates that pattern (ii) is also 
not supported empirically. Therefore, the argument that the observed same-gender 
supervisor wage effects are due to skill sorting is not supported by empirical evidence.  
1.5.2 Whether the gender of supervisor affects workers’ wages via influencing 
workers’ promotion prospect? 
The empirical results show that the supervisors’ wage effects are not prominent at 
the entry of labor market, and it emerges and enlarges as workers’ experience accumulates. 
This pattern could also be observed if the gender of supervisor affects subordinates’ 
promotion prospects.   
Literature suggests that compared to men, women are less likely to engage in 
competitive activities such as bargain, and are more likely to be at a bargaining 
disadvantage (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Croson and Greezy, 2009). It follows that 
female supervisors are associated with lower promotion probability for subordinates, 
because they fail to bargain sufficiently or successfully for their subordinates, especially in 
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predominantly male occupations. This, in turn, may lead to lower average wages for those 
working with female supervisors in predominantly male occupations. Similar story may 
hold for male supervisors in predominantly female occupations.  
NLSY97 data contains information on “whether the respondent has been promoted 
since the last date of interview” in the year 2006-2008, based on which the above argument 
can be tested. Table 1.15 presents the results for the logit regression estimates on the effects 
of having a female supervisor on promotion probability. No evidence is found to support 
the argument that the gender of supervisor is associated with workers’ promotion prospect. 
This indicates that the gender of supervisor does not affect workers’ wages via influencing 
workers’ promotion prospect. 
1.6 Conclusions  
The study starts with a screening-bias model, which allows information distortion 
to interact with supervisor-worker gender match, as well as occupational gender 
composition. In addition, workers’ productivity is assumed to be maximized when their 
skills are well matched to task requirements. Based on these assumptions, information 
distortion leads to different extent of skill mismatch for workers with different supervisors 
in different occupations. When workers are paid according to the expected productivities 
at the entry of an occupation, there’s no average wage gap between those with same-gender 
supervisors and those with opposite-gender supervisors. However, when workers’ true 
productivities are revealed as their experience accumulates, job changes lead to different 
returns to experience. In this way, the average wage gaps between workers with same-
gender supervisors and workers with opposite-gender supervisors emerge and enlarge, 
which vary in occupations of different gender types.  
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Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirically, workers benefit from the 
female supervisors, in terms of better match and higher average wages, in predominantly 
female occupations. These effects remain robust when individual and time fixed effects are 
controlled for. Supervisors’ wage effects are insignificant for workers initially, and it 
emerges as a worker’s career develops. In addition, evidence supports that workers with 
same-gender supervisors receive lower return to experience in occupations with larger 
share of opposite-gender workers, compared to their counterparts with opposite-gender 
supervisors.   
This study contributes to current literature in three ways. First, the empirical 
evidence, to some extent, reconciles the mixed empirical results. “Women benefit women” 
is more likely to be associated with predominantly female occupation, and “Queen Bee 
Syndrome” predominantly male occupation. Similar effects are found to be associated with 
male supervisors. As the supervisor’s wage effects go in the opposite directions in 
predominantly male and female occupations, the opposite effects may cancel out in pooled 
sample regression, leading to insignificant effects at the mean level (Sicilian and Grossberg, 
2014; Hultqvist, 2015). Studies restricted to specific occupations or industries (i.e. large 
grocery retailers in Penner, Toro-Tulla and Huffman, 2012; athletic teams in Bednar and 
Gicheva, 2014; financial occupations on Wall Street in Roth, 2004; law firms in Beckman 
and Phillips, 2005; small businesses in Penner and Toro-Tulla, 2010) only provide partial 
depictions of this effect under certain circumstances.  
Second, this study reveals that supervisors’ task assignment accuracy not only exert 
one-time wage effects on the subordinates, but also affects subordinates’ decision on job 
mobility, the return to experience, as well as their earnings in later career stages. Previous 
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research suggests that men and women receive different returns to tenure because of the 
differences in human capital investment, in anticipated career interruptions, and in training 
and promotion opportunities (O'Neill and Polachek, 1993; Hersch and Reagan, 1997;  
Munasinghe and Reif, 2008). This study adds to this literature from a new perspective, 
revealing how gender difference in returns to experience can be influenced by the 
interaction between supervisor’s gender and occupational gender composition.  
Finally, this study sheds light on whether the pervasive workplace gender wage 
disparity will be attenuated through promoting women’s access to powerful positions. On 
one hand, this study suggests that the same-gender supervisor does affect workers’ wages, 
but the effects comes more from information distortion than discrimination. As are 
suggested in this paper, the managerial staff, either men or women, in occupations 
dominated by opposite-gender workers may themselves be the victims of information 
distortion and compromise their effectiveness in implementing staffing policies. Thus, 
imposing gender quotas in managerial positions, per se, is not sufficient to narrow the 
workplace gender wage gap.  A possible policy implication is, minority managerial staffs 
should not be isolated, while instead policies (e.g. increasing gender diversities in all ranks 
of organization, promoting information flow within organizations) are needed to enhance 
their integration in “gendered” workplace contexts.   
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                             Table 1.1 Cases of Job Mobility at The Second Stage 
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                             Table 1.2 Summary of Inter-Period Wage Gains Conditioning on Mobility Decision 
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                                   Table 1.3 Average Second-period Wage Conditioning on Mobility Decision 
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           Table 1.4 Unconditional Wage Expectations for Workers in Stage 2 
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Table 1.5 NLSY97 Sample Construction 
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 Table 1.6   Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
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 Table 1.7 The Size of Mismatch, by Gender of Supervisor and Occupational Gender Composition 
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         Table 1.8A: Supervisors’ Wage Effects, Not Conditioning on Occupational Gender Composition 
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  Table 1.8 B: Supervisors’ Wage Effects, Conditioning on Occupational Gender Composition 
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    Table 1.9 The Determinants of Skill Mismatch: Gender of Supervisor and Occupational Gender Composition 
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Table 1.10 The Possibilities of being Over/Under-qualified: Gender of Supervisor and 
Occupational Gender Composition 
 
Coeffiicients Log Odds Coeffiicients Log Odds
Female Supervisor 0.3441 1.41 0.5958 1.81
[0.1424]* [0.4045]
Female Supervisor* FEM -0.7198 0.49 -0.7667 0.46
[0.2275]** [0.6363]
FEM -1.0099 0.36 -1.565 0.21
[0.5497]+ [1.5379]
FEM-Squared 1.4692 4.35 2.2342 9.34
[0.4940]** [1.3767]
Observations 33150 33150 15628 15628
Coeffiicients Log Odds Coeffiicients Log Odds
Female Supervisor 0.2866 1.33 0.8644 2.37
[0.1348]* [0.3743]*
Female Supervisor* FEM -0.746 0.47 -1.2587 0.28
[0.2170]** [0.6240]*
FEM 1.9789 7.23 4.9828 145.88
[0.4835]** [1.4418]**
FEM-Squared -1.1115 3.29 -2.9081 0.055
[0.4386]* [1.3270]*
Observations 33150 33150 12505 12505
(1) Logit (2) FE-Logit
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel (A) is a dummy that equals 1 when a worker is more than 
one standard deviation more endowed than required. The dependent variable in Panel (B) is a dummy 
that equals 1 when a worker is more than one standard deviation less endowed than required.  The 
estimations are made based on the "Full" specification as explained in Table 9. Robust standard errors 
are reported  in brackets. **, *, +  indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
(B) Probabilities of being Under-qualified
(A) Probabilities of being Over-qualified
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      Table 1.11 Same-Gender Supervisor Wage Effects along the Career Path 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female Supervisor -0.0156 -0.0397 -0.0577 0.0083 -0.0364 -0.0632
[0.0315] [0.0166]* [0.0182]** [0.0384] [0.0168]* [0.0185]**
Female Supervisor* FEM 0.0222 0.0786 0.1028 -0.0183 0.0682 0.1085
[0.0480] [0.0257]** [0.0282]** [0.0590] [0.0260]** [0.0287]**
FEM -0.0983 -0.1339 -0.0712 -0.0728 -0.1286 -0.07
[0.0408]* [0.0212]** [0.0240]** [0.0497] [0.0214]** [0.0244]**
Observations 5453 14121 13573 5453 14121 13573
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wage in 2002's dollar value. Estimations are based on the full set of 
controls. In IV-fixed effect models, coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model with full specification, 
where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their quadratic forms and interaction terms 
are instrumented. Clustered standard errors are reported  in brackets. **, *, +  indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 levels, respectively.    
3-6 6+
Fixed Effect Model IV-Fixed Effect Model
Labor Market Experience  (Years) Labor Market Experience   (Years)
0-3 3-6 6+ 0-3
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          Table 1.12 Same-Gender Supervisor and Returns to Job Mobility and Continuation 
 
 
FE IV-FE FE IV-FE FE IV-FE
Female Supervisor 0.0002 0 0.0187 0.0193 -0.0058 -0.005
[0.0208] [0.0210] [0.0326] [0.0329] [0.0302] [0.0304]
Female Supervisor*FEM -0.0289 -0.0292 -0.055 -0.0541 0.0013 -0.0066
[0.0323] [0.0325] [0.0470] [0.0474] [0.0541] [0.0546]
Female Supervisor*Movers -0.0736 -0.0724 -0.105 -0.1085 -0.0586 -0.0588
[0.0276]** [0.0278]** [0.0445]* [0.0448]* [0.0421] [0.0424]
Female Supervisor*Movers *FEM 0.1724 0.1702 0.204 0.2063 0.1268 0.1341
[0.0424]** [0.0427]** [0.0638]** [0.0643]** [0.0745]+ [0.0751]+
Movers *FEM -0.1424 -0.1364 -0.1713 -0.1696 -0.1915 -0.1833
[0.0234]** [0.0236]** [0.0466]** [0.0470]** [0.0341]** [0.0344]**
Movers  0.129 -0.0118 0.1738 0.0358 0.1296 -0.0089
[0.0151]** [0.0206] [0.0331]** [0.0382] [0.0193]** [0.0279]
FEM -0.0119 -0.0111 0.0076 0.0069 0.0059 0.0088
[0.0233] [0.0235] [0.0379] [0.0382] [0.0337] [0.0340]
Observation 28865 28865 14692 14692 14173 14173
All Female Male
Notes: The dependent variable is individuals' annual growth rate of real hourly wages. Estimations are based on the full set of controls. In IV-fixed effect models, 
coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model with full specification, where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their 
quadratic forms and interaction terms are instrumented. Robust standard errors are reported  in brackets. **, *, +  indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively.    
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Table 1.13   Gender of Supervisor and Returns to Experience 
 
FE IV-FE
Female Supervisor 0.0671 0.033
[0.0210]** [0.0468]
Female Supervisor * FEM -0.0985 -0.051
[0.0323]** [0.0766]
Female Supervisor * Experience -0.0214 -0.0153
[0.0033]** [0.0081]+
Female Supervisor * Experience* FEM 0.0344 0.0253
[0.0050]** [0.0133]+
Experience* FEM -0.0138 -0.0131
[0.0028]** [0.0048]**
FEM -0.0284 -0.0273
[0.0203] [0.0297]
Experience 0.0028 0.0179
[0.0053] [0.0058]**
Observations 33150 33150
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wage in 2002's dollar value. Estimations are based on the 
full set of controls. In IV-fixed effect models, coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model 
with full specification, where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their 
quadratic forms and interaction terms are instrumented. Clustered standard errors are reported  in 
brackets. **, *, +  indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
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                        Table  1.14 Occupational Skill Requirements and The Probability of Having a Female Supervisor 
 
Coefficients Log-Odds Coefficients Log-Odds Coefficients Log-Odds
Percentile ranks of 
Occupational 
Requirements
-0.3308 0.72 -0.0796 0.92 1.5643 4.78
[0.3621] [0.4269] [0.7393]*
Number of Observations 7815 5289 1970
Notes: The estimations are made based on the fixed effect logit model with full set of control variables. 
Predominantly male occupations are occupations where female workers account for less than 33%; 
predominantly male occupations are occupations where female workers account for more than 67%; 
mixed occupations are occupations where female workers account for 33%-67%. Clustered standard 
errors are reported  in brackets. **, *, +  indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively.     
Predominantly Female 
Occupation
Mixed Occupation
Predominantly Male 
Occupation
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Table 1.15 Female Supervisor and Promotion Probability 
 
 
  
Coefficient Log-Odds Coefficient Log-Odds
Female Supervisor 0.0206 1.02 -0.3479 0.70
[0.1625] [0.2927]
Female Supervisor*FEM -0.1384 0.87 0.1601 1.17
[0.2643] [0.4730]
FEM 0.3023 1.35 -0.8002 0.45
[0.2029] [0.4267]+
Observations
Notes:  The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if an individual have been promoted since the 
last date of interview. This variable is only available from 2006-2008. Estimations are made based on 
logit regression. The clustered standard errors are reported in . **, *, + denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
10948 2911
(1)  Logit (2) FE-Logit
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Figure 1.1 Workers with female(male) supervisors earn higher than would 
be predicted in predominantly female(male) occupations 
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Figure 1.2 Worker-job match quality varies conditioning on gender of 
supervisor and occupational gender composition 
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CHAPTER 2
FOLLOWING (NOT QUITE) IN YOUR FATHER’S FOOTSTEPS: TASK 
FOLLOWERS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There exists an extensive literature documenting the prevalence of 
intergenerational occupational following. That is children have a greater-than-chance 
likelihood of working in the same occupation as their father, particularly among sons 
(Rogoff, 1953; Blau and Duncan, 1967).  
Subsequent work has focused on occupational following within a specific 
occupation and found that occupation following is common and that there is a wage 
premium associated with it. Indeed, this phenomenon has been found in truly a wide variety 
of professions including agriculture, proprietors, doctors, surgeons, politicians, public 
sector workers, race car drivers, lawyers and other professional occupations (Laband and 
Lentz, 1983; Lentz and Laband, 1989; Lentz and Laband, 1990; Groothuis and Groothuis, 
2007; Pinchot, et. al, 2008; Scoppa, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Aina and Nicoletti, 2014).While 
most of the work on this has focused on sons, women are increasingly more likely to work 
in their father’s occupation, beyond what is predicted by the fact that women are now more 
likely to work in any male dominated occupation than in previous generations (Hellerstein 
and Morrill, 2011). 
Laband and Lentz (1983) present an economic framework based on human capital 
acquisition to explain occupational following and its apparent wage premium. In their 
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model children acquire more occupation specific human capital in their father’s occupation 
due to differences in the marginal cost of acquiring occupation specific human capital. In 
addition to making them more likely to choose this occupation, the occupation specific 
human capital is unobserved by researchers, thus providing an explanation for the apparent 
wage premium associated with occupation followers. Similarly, children may inherit 
unobserved skills that make them better at their father’s occupation than others.  
Empirically, a number of papers have attempted to find evidence for the mechanism 
at work among occupational followers. Laband and Lentz (1992) find evidence of 
occupation specific human capital transfers among lawyers and that recipients of these 
transfers earn more than lawyers that do not receive such transfers. Lentz and Laband (1990) 
provide further evidence of transfers of human capital among entrepreneurs. While, Knoll 
et al (2013) offer evidence that occupational following is not due to genetic similarity, but 
rather is caused by upbringing.  
Other work has focused on the possibility of nepotism or family networks as the 
source of occupational following. Lentz and Laband (1989) document a 14% increase in 
the likelihood of being accepted to medical school among the children of doctors that 
cannot be explained.  Scoppa (2009) finds evidence that in Italy the children of public 
sector employees have a substantial advantage in gaining employment in public sector jobs 
themselves. Aina and Nicoletti (2014), also using Italian data, suggest that nepotism and 
networks are common across professions requiring a degree and some sort of licensing 
exam.  
Finally, an alternative explanation is that children are occupation followers because 
of intergenerational correlation, either transferred or inherited, of preferences. If children 
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have similar preferences over occupation characteristics then it would hardly be surprising 
to find they are more likely to be employed in the same occupations, although this does not 
in itself explain any wage premium associated with occupation following. There is some 
evidence that preferences might play a role. Altonji and Dunn (2000) show substantial 
correlation in wages and working hours within families that are primarily driven by 
correlations in preferences. Escriche (2007) demonstrates this on one dimension: the 
likelihood of children to work in gender mixed occupations based on the gender-mix of 
their parents’ occupations. While Ham et al (2009) find that the intergenerational 
transmission of personality matters for occupation choice. Although, it is not entirely clear 
if personality reflects a difference in preferences or a difference in skill.   
In this paper, we explore a similar type of skill transfer from fathers to children: 
task specific skills. In particular, there is the possibility that in addition to general human 
capital and occupation specific human capital, fathers can also transfer task-specific human 
capital to their children.  By task specific human capital, we mean skills that are important 
for the father’s occupation, but might also have a return in other occupations that require 
similar skills. For example, the child of an engineer might receive some human capital that 
is also relevant to being a computer programmer. We document that children are more 
likely to be employed in an occupation where the primary task is the same as that of their 
father, even when the children are not in the same occupation as the father. Further, we 
find that task following is associated with a wage premium, again independent of 
occupational following. That is to say, individuals employed in the same task as their father, 
earn more than otherwise observationally equivalent workers employed in that same task. 
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Empirically, we examine whether children enter into occupations where the 
dominant task, defined as the primary task of the occupation in the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT), is the same as the primary task in their father’s occupation and 
are not in the same occupation as their father, where occupation is defined by the 
occ1990dd code. We call these individuals who are not working in the same occupation, 
but employed in an occupation with the same primary task as task followers. Thus, while 
occupational followers are also working in the same task as their fathers, they are generally 
excluded from what we call task followers.  
Our work is closely related to a pair of recent papers written by Okumura and Usui. 
In the first (Okumura and Usui, 2014), they look at the social skills of parents and the social 
skills of their children using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). 
To proxy for parents’ social skills, which are not measured, they use the skills needed in 
the father’s occupation. They find a large transmission of social skills from parents to their 
children and substantial returns to children from their parents’ social skills. That is they see 
better social skills in the children of fathers who are employed in an occupation that 
requires higher social skills. This implies that on at least one dimension fathers are able to 
transfer a skill associated with their occupation.  
The second paper (Okumura and Usui, 2015) develops a model where fathers can 
invest in a multidimensional set of skills for their children. Empirically, they use National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979 data to investigate the intergenerational 
transmission of occupational skills and racial disparities in their transmission. To do this 
they calculate the correlation (cosine of the angle) between the vector of skills required in 
the father’s occupation to the vector of skills required by the son’s occupation. They find 
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a greater than random intergenerational skill correlation and that the correlation is greater 
for whites than for blacks. Implying that task following is common, but more so for whites. 
White sons also earn a significant wage premium from working in occupations requiring 
similar skills, while black sons face a wage penalty. Further, the degree of skill correlation 
between fathers and sons is larger for highly educated whites, but not for blacks. They 
conclude this intergenerational skill transmission explains a significant portion of the 
black-white wage gap.  
There are a few notable differences in their approach to ours. Most significantly, 
while they compute the correlation across a breadth of specific skills and individual tasks 
performed in a current job, we follow the approach taken in Autor, Levy and Murnane 
(2003) and Autor and Acemoglu (2010), and group these skills/tasks into 6 more general 
groups. DOT has about 40 task components and ONET has about 400, this generalization 
enables us first have a consistent measure throughout the data period. Moreover, as one 
can imagine many of these individual tasks are highly correlated and require the same type 
of transferable skills. Working with these groups also enables us to derive intuition on how 
task following has been affected by structural changes in the labor market and is more 
directly comparable to other literature using task measures.  Among these tasks in our 
analysis we further focus only on the primary task of a job and its share of the overall in 
job in some settings 32 . We also distinguish between task followers and occupational 
followers. Given the previous literature on occupational following, task following (and its 
premium) could be just a byproduct of occupational followers also being task followers. 
Another notable difference is that we include women in our analyses as well. 
                                                          
32 While our preferred approach is to focus on the primary task, our main results are robust to calculating the 
task following measure as a distance between all tasks as in Okumara and Usui (2016). 
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We contribute to the understanding of intergenerational occupation transmission in 
the following ways. First, there does exist substantial task following that is distinct from 
occupational followers. Second, there exists a 5% wage premium associated with task 
following. This premium is independent of the premium associated with occupation 
followers. For comparison, the premium associated with occupational following is 
estimated to be 5-7%. We find, contrary to Okumara and Usui (2016), no difference in the 
task or occupational following premium by race. Third, for college educated women there 
exists a wage premium associated with task and occupation following, but not so for non-
college graduates. For men the premium for task following is confined to college graduates, 
while the premium from occupational following is the same for both groups. The size of 
this premium does not appear to be changing over time for men.  
Our results have implications for intergenerational income persistence as well as 
gender wage differences. First, if the return to transmitting task specific human capital is 
restricted to certain occupations or skills, then, fathers employed in those occupations have 
the potential to transfer more human capital to their children. This could amplify 
intergenerational income persistence. Second, if daughters are unlikely to benefit from 
certain task specific human capital transfers, then the nature of human capital investment 
in daughters will be different than investment in sons for fathers employed in those 
occupations. This could feed greater gender wage differentials, although this might be 
countered by increased investment in general human capital for daughters.  
The paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the theoretical 
framework, section 1.3 describes the data, section 1.4 details the methodology, section 1.5 
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presents our main results, section 1.6 provides discussion of the implications and section 
1.7 concludes.  
2.2 Theoretical framework: Model of Task Following 
We formulize the idea of task following in a simple wage and occupation choice 
model.  Using the model, we will derive the conditions for task following and the wage 
premium associated with task following.  This model will enable us to illustrate the 
relationship between the estimated and the real premium, which differ due to selection in 
the occupation (task) choice process. We will then discuss the testable implications of the 
model.  
Suppose there are two generations of workers (fathers and their offspring) and two 
types of tasks each worker performs, routine tasks and non-routine tasks (R and N). A 
father can pass on task-specific human capital to his offspring if they choose the same task 
as him. Thus, an offspring’s total human capital at a task includes a task-specific ability 
level and these task specific skills inherited from their fathers if they task follow.33   
2.2.1 Wage Determination 
If there is any task specific human capital transfer between generations, wages for 
the second-generation workers are determined as a function of not only their personal 
characteristics and chosen task but also their fathers’ task. Assuming all else equal, task 
dependent components of wage is given as in Eq. (1)   
𝑤௜௝ = 𝛾  [𝐼(𝑖 = 𝑗)𝐻௜+𝜖௝]                                  Eq.  (1) 
where i and j are father’s and the child’s tasks respectively, either routine (R) or non-routine 
(NR) for both. In this equation  𝛾 is the relative price of non-routine to routine task, where 
                                                          
33 While we treat the intergenerational transfer of task-specific human capital as exogenous, the qualitative 
results are similar in a set-up where father’s choose how much human capital to transfer.  
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price of routine tasks is normalized to one and if non-routine tasks are more valued than 
routine tasks in the labor market then γ > 1. The indicator function 𝐼(𝑖 = 𝑗) is for task 
following and Hi captures the human capital transmitted by the father if someone task 
follows. Each individual has a unobserved draw of ability in each task, 𝜖௝.  We assume 
these unobserved task endowments are distributed as standard normal with a correlation of 
𝜌 . So possible wages for the offspring of non-routine workers are either 𝛾𝐻ே + 𝛾𝜖ே 
(labelled as  𝑤ேே ) if they task follow or 𝜖ோ  (labelled as 𝑤ேோ ) if they do not.  For the 
offsprings of routine task holding fathers’ wages are either 𝐻ோ + 𝜖ோ or 𝛾𝜖ே (or 𝑤ோோ and 
𝑤ோே, respectively). We are suppressing the individual indicator subscripts here and this 
point on for simplicity.   
2.2.2 Occupation Choice 
A second-generation worker follows task only if  𝑤ேே > 𝑤ேோ when he has a non-
routine task father (and become an N-task follower) or if  𝑤ோோ > 𝑤ோே when his father’s 
tasks is routine (R-task follower). That is, for the N-task followers we must have:  
𝛾𝐻ே + 𝛾𝜖ே > 𝜖ோ. 
Rearranging this will give us:  
𝜖ோ − 𝛾𝜖ே < 𝛾𝐻ே 
where ቀఊఢಿఢೃ ቁ ~N ൤൫
଴
଴൯, ൬
𝛾ଶ 𝛾𝜌
𝛾𝜌 1 ൰൨. Thus, probability of N-task following is: 
 𝑃ேே = Pr[𝜖ோ − 𝛾𝜖ே < 𝛾𝐻ே] =Pr ቂ
௩
ఙೡ
< ఊுಿ
ఙೡ
ቃ = Φ ቂఊுಿ
ఙೡ
ቃ 
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where Φ(∙)  is normal cdf, v = 𝜖ோ − 𝛾𝜖ே  and 𝜎௩ = [1 + 𝛾ଶ − 2𝜌𝛾]
భ
మ . Probability of R-
Task following can be similarly derived.34 Notice, that due to the presence of task specific 
human capital, workers will choose to task follow even in some cases where they are 
otherwise are more productive in the other task.  
2.2.3 Wage premium to task following 
The estimated wage premium to task following will be the difference between task 
followers’ expected wages and the expected wages of the non-task followers in the same 
task.  For the N-task followers this premium is:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚ே = 𝐸(𝑤ேே) − 𝐸(𝑤ோே ) 
= 𝛾𝐻ே + E[𝛾𝜖ே|𝑣 < 𝛾𝐻ே] − 𝐸[𝛾𝜖ே|𝑣 < 𝐻ோ] 
= 𝛾𝐻ே + 𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖ே, 𝑣)𝐸 ൤ 
𝑣
𝜎௩
<
𝛾𝐻ே
𝜎௩
൨ − 𝐸 ൤
𝑣
𝜎௩
<
−𝐻ோ
𝜎௩
൨ 
= 𝛾𝐻ே + 𝛾𝜌ே௩(−𝜆(𝛿ே) − (−𝜆(𝛿ோ)), 
where 𝜌ே௩  is the correlation between 𝑣 and 𝜖ே, 𝛿ே =
ఊுಿ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ
, 𝛿ோ =
ିுೃ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ
,
and 𝜆(∙)= ஦(∙)
஍(∙) 
 is the inverse Mill’s ratio. Given above assumptions  𝜌ே௩ =
ఘିఊ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ 
  
and the premium can be rewritten as 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚ே = 𝛾𝐻ே + 𝛾
ఊିఘ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ 
[𝜆(𝛿ே) − 𝜆(𝛿ோ)]. 
Note that the premium has two components. The first is simply the value of the 
inherited human capital, which we call the true premium from task following. The second 
                                                          
34 𝑃ோோ =  Pr [𝛾𝜖ே − 𝜖ோ < 𝐻ோ] == Pr ቂ
௨
ఙೠ
< ுೃ
ఙೠ
ቃ =  Φ ቀுೃ
ఙೠ
ቁ    where u=−𝑣 = 𝛾𝜖ே − 𝜖ோ  and 𝜎௨ = [1 + 𝛾ଶ −
2𝜌𝛾]
భ
మ. 
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is the part of the measured premium that is due to selection. Specifically, this is due to 
individuals choosing to task-follow even though they received a relatively better draw in 
the other task. We will refer to this part of the premium as b୒.  The premium for routine 
task following is similarly derived.35  
This model has several testable implications that are of interest to us. Our main 
focus is the existence and magnitude of the wage premium and its determinants. Notice 
first the obvious implication that there will be no premium to task following if individuals 
did not inherit any task specific human capital.  That is, if 𝐻ே = 0, and 𝐻ோ = 0, then 𝛿ே =
𝛿ோ, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚ே = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚ோ = 0.   
Second, the larger the 𝛿ே, the larger the probability for an individual to be an N-
task follower.  ப௉ಿಿ
ப௠ಿ
> 0 , ப௉ಿಿ
ப௠ೃ
< 0, ப௉ಿಿ
புಿ
> 0, and ப௉ಿಿ
பஓ 
> 0.  A rise in γ, the price of N-
task relative to R-task, has two effects on the measured wage premium to N-Task following: 
on one hand, it increases the unconditional wage premium 𝛾𝐻ே ; on the other hand, it 
changes the premium rising from self-selection, b୒.   Since γ > 1, 0 < ρ < 1, 𝛿ே > 𝛿ோ we 
have [𝜆(𝛿ே) − 𝜆(𝛿ோ)] < 0. Thus b୒ < 0 and 
பୠొ
பஓ
< 0. That is an increase in γ decreases 
the estimated wage premium for the N-task followers .   Moreover, as a result 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚ே<𝛾𝐻ே . That is, the estimated wage premium from a Mincerian setup with OLS 
would be the lower bound of the wage premium for task followers over non-task followers 
in N-task.   
                                                          
35  Wage premium to R-task following is : Premiumୖ = 𝐸(𝑤ோோ) − E(𝑤ேோ)  = 𝐻ோ + E[𝜖ோ|𝑢 < 𝐻ோ] −
𝐸[𝜖ோ|𝑢 < −𝛾𝐻ே] = 𝐻ோ +
ఊఘିଵ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ 
[𝜆(−𝛿ே) − 𝜆(−𝛿ோ)]   where 𝛿ே and 𝛿ோ are defined as above and 𝜌ோ௨ 
is the correlation between u and 𝜖ோ .  
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For the R-task followers an increase in γ will not change the unconditional wage 
premium 𝐻ோ, but it affects the measured premium through selection effect. Specifically, 
for bୖ =
ఊఘିଵ
[ଵାఊమିଶఘఊ]
భ
మ 
[𝜆(−𝛿ே) − 𝜆(−𝛿ோ)] we can show that bୖ > 0 and 
பୠ౎
பஓ
> 0 if 𝛾 > ଵ
ఘ
.  
An increase in γ increases the estimated wage premium for the R-task followers.  
2.3 Data 
For this analysis we use the core cohort of the General Social Survey (GSS) data 
from 1972-2010. This is a nationally representative cross-sectional sample. We restrict our 
sample to individuals between the ages of 18-65, with a valid census occupational code 
(occ70, occ80), no missing information and who are employed by someone other than 
themselves or the military.36 This leaves us with 12882 observations over 28 cohorts from 
1972-2010.  
Occupational codes are not recorded consistently across each wave of the survey. 
Between 1972 and 1987, the occupations are coded according to both the 1970 census 
codes. Between 1988 and 2010, however, jobs are exclusively identified using the 1980 
census codes to capture the new and emerging occupations.  
We mapped these occupational codes so as to be able to study the full extent of the 
occupation data panel available to us. Specifically, we used the crosswalks provided by 
David Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013), giving 3-digit occupation codes—or 
1990dd—that can serve as a link between occupation codes of 1970, 1990, and 2000 census. 
We first use their crosswalk linking 1970 and 1990dd and then the crosswalk linking 2000 
                                                          
36 Employed is defined as having a working status is “Working full time”, “Working part-time”, and “With 
a job, but not at work because of temp illness, vacation and strikes”. We do not consider individuals whose 
working status are “Unemployed or laid off”, “Retired”, “In School”, and “Keeping house”. We also excluded 
individuals who are 1) current armed-forces, 2) former armed forces with no valid occupational codes, 3) 
self-employed. 
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and 1990dd, so that all occupations in our sample will be measured by 1990dd codes in a 
consistent fashion.37  
After successfully converting the occupational codes to 1990dd, we merge in 
characteristics of jobs using skills and task measures embedded in each job. The measures 
were developed by a series of studies on skills of jobs by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), 
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), making effort to define 
the “task content” for different occupations. Where a task is a unit of work activity that can 
produce either goods or service or both, and workers are regarded as allocating their skills 
on different tasks required on different jobs.38  
Occupations are then categorized based on the composition of tasks.39 For our 
purposes we will use six categories defining the task associated with a job: non-routine 
                                                          
37 These occupational codes were downloaded from David Dorn’s website http://www.cemfi.es 
/~dorn/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015. In GSS data, occupational codes are not recorded consistently across each 
wave of the survey. Between 1972 and 1987, the occupations are coded according to both the 1970 census 
codes. Between 1988 and 2010, however, jobs are exclusively identified using the 1980 census codes to 
capture the new and emerging occupations. In the mapping of occ1970 to occ1990dd, two occupations that 
could not be directly mapped. One of them is occupation “280” from occ1970 “sales and salesmen clerk” 
(884 respondents in the sample). We assign occ1990dd code 274 to this occupation, guided by the occupation 
definitions contained in Meyer and Osborne (2005) and in Dorn (2009).  Another occupation with occ70 
coded as 590 in GSS data, containing 165 observations in fathers’ data and 191 observations in individuals’ 
data. Since the code cannot be found in census 1970 codes, (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/97occup.shtml), 
it is left un-coded in occ1990dd. All the occ80 codes are matched to occ1990dd expect for current and former 
arm-forces. Details of the procedure are available upon request. 
38 The Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) is originally used by Autor, Levy and 
Murnane (2003) to impute to workers the task measures associated with their occupations, and then it is also 
verified and merged with Occupational Information Network (O* Net), Census and CPS occupational 
categories. 
39 There are 4 occupations have no task measurements in Autors’ data, and they are: 1) occ1990dd=227, 
occ80=227: “Air traffic Controllers and Airfield Operations Specialists”. 2) Occ1990dd=303, occ1980=303: 
“First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Office and Administrative Support”. 3) Occ1990dd=503, occ1980=503: 
“First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers”. 4) Occ1990dd=803, 
occ1980=803: “Supervisors, Transportation and Material Moving Workers”. Given that these occupations 
accounts for a small proportion in sample (less than 100 observations), we do not include these observations 
in the analysis. 
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cognitive, analytical, non-routine cognitive interpersonal, routine cognitive, routine 
manual, non-routine manual physical and non-routine manual interpersonal.40 
2.4 Methodology 
In order to document the nature of task following we will first provide a descriptive 
look at the dominant task in an individual’s occupation conditional on only their father’s 
occupations’ dominant task. In these tabulations we will try to capture if individuals are 
disproportionally more likely to be in occupations where they perform the same primary 
tasks as their father. Our main test of this is whether the likelihood an individual is in task 
i conditional on their father being in task i is higher than the likelihood an individual is in 
task i conditional on their father being in a task other than task i. We do this for all 
individuals and for the subsample that does not include individuals that are in the same 
occupation as their father (at a three-digit occupation code). 
Then we will estimate log wage equations in a Mincerian setting to capture the 
wage returns to task following. In these equations in addition to standard controls we will 
specifically control for whether the individuals are in the same task or the same occupation 
as their fathers. For all of our wage regressions, we define task-followers as individuals 
that are in the same task, but different occupations (defined at a three-digit level).  
The following is the baseline log wage equation we estimate: 
log(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒௦) = 𝛼ᇱ𝑋௦ + 𝛽ଵ(𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘௦) + 𝛽ଶ(𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௦) +  𝜀௦ 
where real wage is calculated in 1982 dollars and 𝑋௦ is a vector of individual level controls 
for the respondent’s (s) highest years of schooling, potential experience (age – 6 – years of 
schooling), experience-squared, marital status, race, gender, union-status, number of 
                                                          
40 See definitions for skills in the Appendix D. 
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children, and their fathers' highest years of schooling, mothers' highest years of schooling, 
cohort and region indicators as well as dummy controls for occupation groups and 
industries for the specific (at three digit level) occupation they are employed in.  We also 
include gender controls and gender interactions with the task and occupation following 
dummies in the baseline model. We sometimes estimate this baseline model separately by 
gender to allow for more flexible slope estimates. We might expect the returns to task 
following to be different by education status or across general occupational groups.  In 
order to allow differential returns by education, in an extension to the basic model, we 
include an indicator for being a college graduate and following one’s father’s task.  
2.5  Main Results 
Our main results are organized as follows. First we present the evidence that task 
following is a real phenomenon and is distinct from occupational following. Next we 
present the basic results on the wage premium associated with task following and finally 
we explore how this varies by the interaction of education and gender.  
2.5.1 Task Followers 
To describe the nature and degree of task following, we first calculate the matrix of 
child task and father task combinations, including those who work in the same occupation 
as their father. The results are presented in Table 2.1. 
Each cell represents the fraction of all children with that own task/father task 
combination. For example, the first cell (upper left) shows that in 2.5 percent of all 
observations the child is in a non-routine, cognitive analytical task and has a father that 
was also in a non-routine cognitive analytical task. The diagonal of Table 2.1 is the fraction 
of all offspring that are task followers by each dominant task. The total row reports the 
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fraction of fathers that are employed in each dominant task, while the total column reports 
the fraction of children by their dominant task. This serves to highlight the differences 
across generations in the share of jobs with each dominant task, partly due to changes in 
overall job composition in the economy and partly due to the inclusion of women. While 
only 4.5% of fathers are employed in a routine cognitive task, 16.5% of the offspring are 
employed in an occupation with that dominant task. Non-routine manual physical tasks, on 
the hand, make up 37.1% of the father’s task, while only 16.1% of the children. These 
changes in composition muddy the degree of task following among children. For example, 
while the fraction of children whose father was employed in a non-routine manual physical 
task, that follow their father is just 20.8% (7.7/37.1), among the children that are employed 
in a non-routine manual physical task, nearly 50% (7.7/16.1) are task followers.   
In Table 2.2 we report the fraction of offspring in each task conditional on the 
dominant task in their father’s occupation (each cell in table 1 divided by the total row). 
The diagonal of Table 2.2 is the fraction of children that are task followers (including 
occupational followers) by each task. The next to last column reports the fraction of 
offspring in each task, conditional on not being a task follower. The last column reports 
the results of a t-test that the diagonal is significantly different from the next to last column.  
The most pronounced task following is in the non-routine cognitive analytical task, 
where the fraction of offspring, conditional on that also being the father’s task, is nearly 
twice as large as the unconditional fraction (26% vs. 13.5%). For each task, the dominant 
task of the father is either the most common or second most common outcome. Further the 
likelihood an offspring enters a given task, conditional on their father being in that task, is 
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higher than the likelihood an individual enters that task conditional on the father not being 
in that task and this difference is statistically significant for every task.  
Of course, this could just be a reflection of the fact that occupation followers are 
also employed in the same task as their fathers. To demonstrate that task following exists 
and is distinct from occupation following, we report the same calculation as in Table 2.2 
excluding the occupation followers.  
Again, task following is common and the likelihood an offspring enters a task 
conditional on their father being in that task is higher than the likelihood an offspring enters 
that task conditional on their father not being employed in that task. This difference is 
statistically significant for all tasks except routine cognitive (Table 2.3).  
Since we are interested in task followers as distinct from occupation followers, for 
all of the remaining analyses we will not count an occupational follower as a task follower, 
but will instead include a separate occupational follower dummy. 
2.5.2  Wage Premium 
The results from the wage regression are presented in Table 2.4.  In the first column 
(No Controls) we report the correlation between wages and following, while the second 
column (Basic) includes basic individual level controls. Standard specification (column 3) 
adds industry controls and occupation group controls and is the baseline model we will use 
in the analyses to follow. Finally, the last column, expanded specification, includes detailed 
occupation controls.    
When there are no controls for occupations (First two columns - No Controls and 
Basic), there is a statistically significant 5-6% wage premium associated with task 
following. Occupation followers earn a statistically significant 9-10% wage premium, 
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when basic individual characteristics are controlled for. When we control for occupation 
groups and industry groups (Standard), there is still a 5% wage premium for task followers, 
while the premium associated with occupation followers is reduced to 4%. Finally, when 
detailed occupational controls are added in addition to occupation group controls and 
industry controls, the wage premium remains at 4.5% for task followers and 4% for 
occupational followers. This suggests that task followers, even when working in 
occupations that are similar by group and by detailed job requirements, earn a wage 
premium over those that are not task followers.  
Okumura and Usui find a similar task premium, however, they find this only for 
whites. To compare our findings to their results, we do the same analysis as in Table 2.4, 
only grouping by race.41 Table 2.5 reports these wage premium estimates by race.  While 
there does seem to be a negative relationship between wages and both task and occupation 
following among African Americans (No Controls), this disappears when occupation and 
industry controls are included. The point estimate for African Americans is nearly the same 
as for whites, however, it is more imprecisely identified and is not statistically significant. 
Occupational following, however, does not seem to have a positive premium associated 
with it among African Americans.  
To explore the source of the task and the occupational follower premium we next 
run the wage regression with interaction terms between an individuals’ education status 
and task/occupation following.  
For all three samples (pooled, men and women) the coefficient on task following is 
insignificant, but a large, positive, statistically significant coefficient is found on the 
                                                          
41 Estimates using Okumura and Usui measure is available upon request.  
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interaction between task following and college graduates. Interestingly the occupation 
following premium for men is largely unaffected and the interaction between occupation 
followers and college graduates is close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, for 
women the occupation premium coefficient is very small, but the interaction term is large 
(25%) and significant at the 5% level when controlling for occupations (Table 2.6).  
These results imply that task following is associated with higher wages primarily 
for college graduates and that is true across gender. This could be partly because of changes 
in the rewards to specific tasks overtime. If the market returns to skills that are not 
associated with college graduates has decreased, then the investments that the fathers with 
those skills made in their children are less valuable in the future.  
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Factors that Determine Task Following 
The fact that the wage premium differs across gender and schooling is suggestive 
that task and occupation following might also vary along these dimensions. To test for 
differences, we perform a logit analysis on the likelihood of being an occupation follower 
and an analysis on the likelihood of being a task follower.  
Table 2.7 reports the coefficients on gender, race and schooling from the logit 
analysis. For both occupation and task following, women are much less likely to be 
followers. Education is also associated with being less likely to be a follower. This could 
be a function of the higher education attainments of children. However, the interaction 
between gender and schooling is positive and significant. That is to say that highly educated 
women are much more likely to be task and occupation followers than highly educated 
men, controlling for the fact that women in general are less likely to be followers.  
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Consistent with the results in Okumura and Usui, African Americans are less likely 
to be occupational followers. However, when only looking at task followers, the effect is 
small and statistically insignificant.  
2.6.2 Time Trend 
Given the change in the composition of occupations and the dominant task 
associated with each occupation over time, we perform our baseline analysis with 
interaction terms between task followers and post 1990 and occupation followers and post 
1990. The results of this are presented in Table 2.8. 
For men there is little to suggest that the premium associated with task and 
occupation following is different. However, for women the premium for occupation 
following is large in the post 1990s period, while indistinct from zero previously. This is 
likely driven by the increased integration of women in previously male dominated jobs. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper we document that there is a substantial amount of what we refer to as 
task following; that is children who enter into occupations that use similar skills as their 
father’s occupation, but are not the same occupation. We find that task following is lower 
among women and the higher educated, however it is relatively higher for more educated 
women.  
Further, in line with previous work on occupational following, task following is 
associated with higher wages. The magnitude of the premium is of a similar magnitude as 
occupation following when controlling for occupation groups. This premium appears to be 
much larger for college graduates. We find no differences in the task premium associated 
with race.  
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This provides additional evidence that fathers are able to transmit task related skills 
to their children and this has benefits in the labor market. While not a direct test of the 
nepotism hypothesis for occupational following, this seems to be an unlikely source of the 
task following premium. While, fathers may be able to provide opportunities within an 
occupation, this seems much less likely to be true across occupations. Although, if fathers’ 
networks span occupations within a task grouping, then nepotism could still be an 
explanation.    
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     Table 2.1 Intergenerational Task Transition, and Distribution of Tasks for Fathers and Offspring 
 
 
 
     Table 2.2 Intergenerational Task Transition, Share Conditional on Father’s Task 
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   Table 2.4 Father Followers’ Premium, GSS 1972-2010 
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                          Table 2.5 Father Task Follower’s Premium Coefficients by Race, GSS 1972-2010 
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                             Table 2.6 Wage Premium for Father Followers, Role of Education 
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CHAPTER 3
FATHER COMPETITION: THE CAREER EFFECTS OF HAVING A 
CADRE PARENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Recently, a new slang term Pin Die (father competition), has become popular in 
China. Pin Die refers to the idea that the success of an individual depends more on his or 
her parents' economic, political and social advantages than on one’s own efforts. There are 
concerns that “father competition” will result in strong intergenerational income 
persistence and make it harder for people from less privileged families to succeed, which 
has been a major source of income inequality during China's transition from a central 
planned economy to a market-driven one (Meng, 2004, 2007; Whyte, 2012; Knight, 2014). 
This social phenomenon has triggered a surge of literature investigating whether and how 
parents' education, income, and occupations affect their offspring’s education, health and 
earnings (Lam and Schoeni, 1993; Wang, 2005; Li, 2006; Yao and Zhao, 2006; Li, Liu, 
Zhang and Ma, 2007; Chen and Cowell, 2013; Eriksson, Pan and Qin, 2014) 42. 
Cadres, defined as people in administrative positions in governments and pseudo-
government organizations (e.g. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public organizations), 
are among the privileged in China. Viewed as “the political elite” (Lee 1991, p.5), cadres 
are “distinguished from the masses by their power and authority” (Barnett and Vogel 1967, 
                                                          
42 Literature has also well documented the intergenerational income persistence in the developed countries, 
which will not be discussed in details in this article. For details, please refer to Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2002), Corak (2013),  Solon (2002, 2004),  Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007),  Lefgren, Sims, and Lindquist 
(2012).  
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p.39). 43  Cadre parents and their offspring have received wide attention in the public 
discussion of “father competition” but are much less discussed in the literature of 
intergenerational correlations in socio-economic attainment.  
Research has pointed out that political privilege affects individuals’ own business 
profits (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007; 
Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Xiong and Shan, 2013) and wage earnings (Nee, 1989, 
1991, 1996; Bian and Logan, 1996; Gerber, 2000; Morduch and Sicular, 2000; Liu, 2003; 
Apleton, Knight, Song and Xia 2009; Yang, Wang and Liu, 2010; Zhang, Giles and Rozelle, 
2012). Given this, one may expect cadre parents to affect their offspring's labor market 
outcomes through several possible transmission channels (Lin and Bian, 1991; Bian, 2002; 
Meng, 2007). First, cadre parents are the elites of a society, who may pass better genetic 
inheritance on to their children and make greater and more efficient human capital 
investments (Broaded and Liu, 1996). Second, because they have close political 
connections with government, cadre parents may enlarge the size and improve the quality 
of their offspring's social networks, leading to better career opportunities and higher 
earnings (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Yang, Wang and Liu, 2010; Jia, Lan and 
GSB, 2013). Third, given that rent-seeking firms tend to approach powerful government 
officials to get more resources and business opportunities, cadre parents may ensure higher 
                                                          
43 The concept of cadre in China change substantially over years, which grew from “the leaders of masses” 
in revolutionary contexts to “the political elite and the functionaries staffing the huge party-state apparatus.” 
(Lee 1991, 5.). In the contemporary concept, cadres are not necessarily CCP members, and CCP members 
are not all cadres. Cadres in government are considered as “leaders”, different from the ordinary civil servants 
who are “being led". Moreover, managerial status in SOEs are counted as cadres since they were once covered 
by the same personnel management system as government officials. Even after decades of reform, they still 
share some special political linkages to government officials. Usually, a person with an administrative 
position in SOEs can move parallel to positions of the same level in government agencies. (See 
http://countrystudies.us/china/113.htm,2/23/14 7:23pm).  
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earnings for children in specific firms that are closely related to government networks (Fan, 
2002; Cheung, Jing, Rau, and Stouraitis 2005). 
Two recent studies in China have attempted to explore whether individuals benefit 
from cadre parents. First, Jia et al. (2013) suggest that individuals with cadre parents are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs. With respect to labor market outcomes, Li et al. (2012) 
provide evidence that college graduates do benefit from cadre parents in terms of higher 
starting wages. This study includes many control variables of family background and 
individual characteristics (e.g. college entrance exam scores, college activities and college 
human capital attributes). However, using data from a college-based survey, only broad 
measurements of occupation-related characteristics (i.e. job location, industry, and firms' 
ownership types) are included in the analysis. These control variables capture the 
differences in individual tastes and labor quality, while the cadre parent effects can be 
correlated with differences in occupations and social networks between individuals with 
and without cadre parents. For example, if having a cadre parent is associated with better-
paid job features, more valuable social networks and higher wages, the previously 
estimated cadre parent wage premium could be biased upward. Therefore, it is necessary 
to include measurements of detailed job characteristics and social networks to capture the 
differences in job characteristics, social networks and even some of the unobserved skill 
endowments.  
This study empirically explores whether cadre parents improve their offspring’s 
labor market outcomes, in terms of wages and promotion prospects. Taking advantage of 
rich information on occupation-related characteristics and social networks in the data from 
China General Social Survey (CGSS 2006), the goal of this study is to examine whether 
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the cadre parent premium reported in previous literature is real or whether it just reflects 
the differences in occupation-related characteristics and social networks that are associated 
with having a cadre parent. If the latter, the issue then turns to why cadre parents are 
associated with job characteristics and social networks that lead to better labor market 
outcomes and what policies can be put in place to ensure equal opportunities for individuals 
from less privileged families in China.  
The empirical findings contribute to the current literature in the following manners. 
First, this study documents a positive relationship between cadre parents and their 
offspring’s promotion prospects, which has not been discussed in previous literature. 
Empirically, the evidence shows that individuals with cadre parents are more likely to be 
promoted in terms of both position and wage promotions. The effects are independent of 
individual and parental characteristics, as well as a rich set of job characteristics. Second, 
the cadre-parent wage premium is around 10% at the mean level, independent of individual, 
parental characteristics, which is consistent with findings in Li et al. (2012). However, for 
offspring in the above-median income group, around 30-50% of the observed cadre parent 
premium can be explained by detailed job characteristics. This implies that this group of 
individuals with cadre parents earn higher wages because they end up doing different jobs 
compared to those without cadre parents. Moreover, this study, incorporates measures of 
social networks and empirically shows that cadre parents contribute to valuable social 
networks that offspring can lean on as their career develops. Specifically, evidence 
suggests that around 50% of the cadre parent premium at the mean level can be explained 
by individual’s closer relations with government officials, managers and people from the 
publicly owned enterprises. This finding suggests that the previously observed cadre parent 
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wage premium are biased upward. However, the cadre parent effects on one’s promotion 
prospects remain robust after controlling for social network differences, implying that 
having a cadre parent is a type of social capital that individuals can lean on as their careers 
develop. 
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the data, 
variable measurements and summary statistics of related variables. Section 3.3 introduces 
the econometric model and methods used in this study. Section 3.4 provides the major 
empirical results and Section 3.5 discusses possible explanations of the cadre-parent 
premium. Section 3.6 summarizes conclusions and discusses the results. 
3.2 Data and Statistics Description 
The data used in this research is from China General Social Survey (CGSS) (2006). 
Started in 2003, CGSS is the first continuous national social survey project in mainland 
China, which is jointly carried out by Renmin University of China and University of Hong 
Kong Science and Technology. The CGSS (2006) data covers 28 out of 31 provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions (not including Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet). The 
data set contains a rich set of information on individuals' characteristics, their parents' 
personal characteristics (education, income, and employment status, etc.), China 
Communist Party (CCP) membership and cadre status. Parents' information is surveyed 
regardless of whether they live with their children. This helps to avoid any co-inhabitant 
selection bias.   
We restrict our sample to working-age individuals (18-59 for men and 18-55 for 
women) with urban Hukou (urban household registration identity). We focus on 
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respondents with full-time working status who work more than 30 hours per week.44 
Altogether there are 1,983 individuals in the sample and 879 with valid information on 
wages and major individual/parental characteristics. Wage is defined to include the 
regular wages, bonus, allowances, subsidies, welfare payments, and other wage income. 
The analysis of cadre parent wage effects is based on the monthly wage earnings from the 
survey for the month before the interview in 2005.45 Table 3.1 reports the summary 
statistics of major variables for all individuals, as well as for individuals with and without 
a cadre parent, respectively. In our sample, 20 % of individuals have at least one cadre 
parent, 17 % have only a cadre father, and 5% have only a cadre mother. Individuals with 
a cadre parent have had higher rates of position and wage promotion in the past three years. 
They also have had higher average monthly/hourly earnings compared to those without 
cadre parents; this wage difference equals around 300 CNY. The two groups exhibit few 
differences in average years of education, gender distribution, proportion of CCP 
members and occupation/industry distribution. Appendix E provides how these variables 
are measured. 
Table 3.2 provides a sketch of how cadre parents affect the income distribution of 
the next generation, using the intergenerational income transmission matrices for the non-
cadre parent group and the cadre parent group, respectively. The percentage in each cell 
                                                          
44 Only 40 % of full-time workers in our sample reported weekly working hours of  40-44 hours, which is 
the legal weekly working hour in China. Nearly 30 % of these workers reported working more than 50 hours 
per week. This may reflect measurement errors in this self-reported working hours, and related variables. 
Here we restrict our sample to those work more than 30 hours per week to ensure an adequate sample size 
with reasonable working hours. 
45 The hourly wage rates are also calculated based on monthly wages, using self-reported weekly working 
hours. The analysis of cadre parent wage effects in this study is carried out twice, using the monthly wage 
and the hourly wage rate respectively. The results are similar between estimations based on monthly wages 
and those based on hourly wages. However, hourly wage is noisier than monthly wage given the possible 
measurement errors with the self-reported weekly working hours. Therefore, we focus on monthly wage as 
our preferred dependent variable and interpret our findings based on this variable.  
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denotes the proportion of offspring in each income quantile, depending on the income 
quantiles of their fathers. These can be interpreted as the possibility of an individual's 
earnings falling into quantile i conditioned on their fathers’ earnings falling into quantile j. 
Absolute value of t-statistics reports whether the probabilities differ significantly between 
cadre-parent group and non-cadre parent group. 
The transmission matrices reveal that having a cadre parent appears to have the 
following effects on the intergenerational income transmission. First, it promotes the 
upward income mobility for low income groups. For fathers in the bottom income group 
(1st quantile), the probability of their offspring reaching the second highest income group 
(4th quantile) is only 14% for the non-cadre parent group and is 40% for the cadre parent 
group. It appears that having a cadre parents helps individuals reach a higher income 
stratum, and it serves as a driving force to facilitate upward income mobility. Second, it 
consolidates the income persistence in the high-income strata. For fathers in the top 
income group (5th quantile), the probability of their offspring falling into the 2nd -quantile 
income group is 16% for non-cadre parent group, and is 6% for cadre parent group; the 
probabilities of their offspring falling into the 1st-quantile income group is 14% for non-
cadre parent group, and is only 6% for cadre parent group. For fathers in the top income 
group, the probability that their offspring remain in the same income group is similar 
(around 38%) for both non-cadre parent and cadre parent groups. This transmission matrix 
reveals that there seems to be some economic benefits associated with having a cadre 
parent, which places the second generation of cadres at the center of the “father 
competition” discussion.  
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3.3 Empirical Models 
3.3.1 Wage 
This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors 
to see whether having at least one cadre parent will significantly increase an individual's 
income at the mean level. The specified empirical model is shown as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤௜ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜ + 𝛽ଶ𝑋௜ + 𝛽ଷ𝑌௜ + 𝛽ସ𝑍௜ + 𝛽ହ𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛௜ + 𝜖௜   (1) 
In the above specification, the dependent variable is the natural log of an 
individual's monthly wage income. 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one 
of individual i's parents is a cadre.  𝛽ଵ captures the cadre-parent effects on offspring's wages. 
𝑋௜  is a vector of the worker's demographic and human capital characteristics, such as 
gender, age, education, experience, experience-squared, CCP membership and cadre status 
etc. 𝑌௜  is a vector of parental characteristics, including parents' political status (CCP 
member identifier dummy), fathers' annual income and parents' education. 𝑍௜ is a vector of 
individual’s occupational-related characteristics, including occupational/industrial groups, 
enterprise ownership, as well as a set of detailed occupational characteristics46.  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛௜ 
is a set of control variables for regional variation. If the cadre parent premium is highly 
correlated with individual/parental/occupational characteristics, the inclusion of 𝑋௜ , 𝑌௜ and 
𝑍௜ may render the coefficient of 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜ insignificant.  
                                                          
46 These detailed occupational characteristics include whether training is required and how much time needed 
to acquire skills at work; whether respondents have taken on-the-job training; whether the work is repetitive; 
whether individuals are aware of the tasks; whether the work requires following standard rules, long time 
work, heavy workload, frequent movement, quick thinking and response; whether the working environment 
is clean and tidy; whether the wage determination is related to performance. 
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3.2 Promotion 
With respect to the cadre-parent effects on promotion, the empirical specification 
follows the theoretical framework in Cobb-Clark (2001). The probability that a worker i 
gets promoted is determined as a function of index Y (the index of promotability in Cobb-
Clark 2001), which is modeled as:  
𝑌௜ = 𝜃଴ + 𝜃ଵ𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜ + 𝜃ଶ𝑋௜ + 𝜃ଷ𝑌௜ + 𝜃ସ𝑍௜ + 𝜃ହ𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛௜ + 𝜂௜              (2) 
In the above specification, 𝑌௜  equals to one if an individual has received either 
position or wage promotions in the past three years. This treatment of promotion is similar 
to Cobb-Clark and Dunlop (1999), Cobb-Clark (2001), and Addison, Ozturk and Wang 
(2014). 𝜃ଵ captures the influence of parents' cadre status on their offspring's promotion 
prospects. 𝑋௜ ,𝑌௜and 𝑍௜ are vectors of individual, parental and occupational characteristics 
as in specification (1). Specification (2) specification is estimated using a probit model. 
3.3 Wage premium by income groups 
The OLS regression focuses only on the mean-level income effects of having a 
cadre parent. It fails to look into the economic effect of having a cadre parent on different 
income groups. The quantile regression model is more flexible than the OLS regression in 
that it allows for studying the effects of covariates on the whole distribution of the income 
groups. Let 𝑄ఒ(𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒௜|𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜) ൫𝜆 ∈ (0,1)൯ denote the 𝜆 th quantile of the natural 
logarithm monthly income of an individual i for explanatory variables, 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜. We model 
these conditional quantiles by: 
𝑄ఒ(𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒௜|𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜) = 𝐺௜ᇱ𝛾(𝜆) + 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚௜ᇱ𝛼(𝜆) + 𝛿௜                  (3),  
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where  𝛼(𝜆) is a vector of quantile coefficients for “cadre parent” dummy; 𝐺௜ is a 
vector of control variables, including  𝑋௜ ,𝑌௜and 𝑍௜ as defined in specification (1);  𝛾(𝜆) is 
a vector of quantile coefficients of the control variables.  
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1  Cadre-parent Premiums 
(1)  Wage  
Table 3.3 shows the robust OLS regression results for the average working-age 
population. Panel A reports the wage effects of having at least one cadre parent. Panel B 
estimates whether the cadre parent premium mainly comes from mother or father, and 
whether the premium will be enhanced when both parents are cadres. In panel A, column 
1 reports the estimated coefficient of βଵ with no other control variables. For individuals 
with a cadre parent, we expect to see about 21.3% higher average wages. After controlling 
for parents’ characteristics (i.e. fathers’ yearly income, parents’ CCP membership, parents’ 
education) and individual characteristics (i.e. gender, years of schooling, experience, 
experience-squared, CCP member, cadre status, firms' ownership structures and economic 
regions), the cadre-parent wage premium is still significant at 5% level, with the magnitude 
shrinking to 9.3% (Column 2, “Basic” specification). Considering that the cadre parent 
wage premium may capture the ability differences of workers that sort into different 
industrial/occupational categories, dummies of occupational/ industrial groups are added 
to the regression (Column 3, “Standard” specification). The cadre parent premium is still 
significant and the magnitude does not change much (8.8%). These results are consistent 
with what is found in Li et, al (2012). 
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In Panel B, we replace the cadre-parent dummy in panel A with three dummies: 
cadre father, cadre mother, and cadre mother interacts with cadre father47. Similar as in 
panel A, the first column in panel B reports the estimation with no other control variables, 
the second column adds controls for individual and parents’ characteristics, and the third 
controls for occupational/industrial groups. Comparing to individuals with no cadre parent, 
those with only a cadre father enjoy significantly higher average wages. The premium 
associated with having only a cadre mother shows marginal significance when control 
variables are added to regression. The magnitude of having only cadre mothers, when 
significant, is higher than the magnitude of having only cadre fathers. However, the 
interaction term of cadre-mother and cadre-father dummies is not significant, indicating 
that the wage premium when both parents are cadres is not significantly higher than the 
case of having only a cadre father. This implies that the number of cadre parents makes 
little difference. 
Table 3.4 reports how the explanatory power of cadre parent premium changes 
across alternative specifications, and across the conditional distribution of offspring’s wage 
earnings.  Column (1) reports the cadre parent wage premium based on the robust OLS 
regression, and Columns (2)- (6) report the estimated cadre parent premium across 
offspring’s income quantile groups based on quantile regressions. After controlling for 
individual characteristics (Row 2), the cadre parent premium observed in “No control” 
specification shrinks substantially across the income distribution. Particularly for those in 
90-percentile income group, the cadre-parent effect shrinks from 28.5% to 4.9% and 
become insignificant. This implies that for individuals at the top of income distribution, 
                                                          
47 For those whose parents are both cadres, all the three dummies, cadre father, cadre mother and cadre father* 
cadre mother equal to one.  
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the observed cadre parent premium can be largely explained by differences in individual’s 
characteristics. 
Adding controls for parents’ characteristics and occupational/industrial groups 
affects the cadre parent premium very little for individuals below the top income groups. 
The cadre parent premium remains significant with the magnitudes between 9%-10% (Row 
3 and Row 4). Comparing Row 5 and Row 6, we see that adding the occupational training 
requirements are the most influential to the cadre parent premium for offspring in the 
above-medium wage groups. The estimated coefficients on cadre parent premium are 
insignificant, with the magnitude shrinking from 9.8% to 6.6% in the 75-percentile wage 
group and from 2.3% to -0.6% in the 90-perentile wage group. When adding detailed 
occupational characteristics, the estimated coefficients of the cadre parent premium 
become insignificant for individuals at the bottom and the median income groups. However, 
at the mean level, the cadre parent premium remains positive and significant even after 
controlling for a rich set of occupational characteristics.   
In summary, empirical evidence in this section indicates that a cadre parent 
contributes to around a 10% wage premium at the mean level, which remains significant 
when individual/parental/occupational characteristics are controlled for. The premium is 
more prominent for offspring at the below-median wage distribution than for those at the 
above-median wage distribution. For offspring at the above-median wage distribution, 
much of the cadre parent premium can be explained by the differences in 
individual/occupational characteristics. This implies that for individuals at the above-
median income groups, the observed cadre parent premium does not come from their 
 88 
 
father’s special social status per se, but comes from their superior ability and higher returns 
associated with their job characteristics.  
 (2) Promotion Prospects 
Table 3.5 reports the effects of cadre parents on offspring’s promotion prospects. 
The first two columns report the estimated coefficients and marginal effects on position-
rank promotions, and the last two columns show estimations on wage-rank promotions. 
The cadre parent effects are estimated and reported across various specifications as defined 
in the previous section. Notice that having a cadre parent contributes to higher average 
probability of position-rank promotion (5.5%-7.8%) and wage-rank promotion (5.8%-
10.4%). The effects are independent of the observable individual/parental/occupational 
characteristics.  
3.5 Discussion of Transmission Mechanisms  
The above analysis shows that the cadre parent premium exists in terms of better 
promotion prospects and higher wage earnings. One is then left to explain why the cadre-
parent premium exists and how it is transmitted to the second generation. In this section, 
we explore possible mechanisms through which cadre parents transfer their advantages to 
offspring. This section explores two mechanisms that may contribute to the observed cadre-
parent premium.  
3.5.1 Social Networks   
One possible mechanism that may lead to the cadre-parent premium is social 
networks. It is possible that individuals with a cadre parent have larger and better qualities 
of social networks compared to those without a cadre parent (Knight and Yueh 2008). This 
mechanism, however, has not been examined in previous literature due to data restrictions. 
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This subsection explores whether and how social networks serve as a channel that transmit 
cadre parent premium from one generation to the next.  
In this study, the characteristics of “Spring Festival network” are used as proxies 
for offspring’s social networks. The Spring Festival is the most important traditional 
festival in China for family reunions and social visits. The “Spring Festival network” has 
been used by many studies as a measurement of social networks in China (Bian and Li 
2000; Jia et al. 2013; Zhao 2002; Zhao 2013). CGSS2006 contains rich information on 
Spring Festival visitors, including the size of the social network (total number of 
family/non-family member visitors), the composition of social network (visitors’ 
occupation, the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises). Visitors’ occupations are 
categorized into three groups: 1) peasants and ordinary workers, including peasants, 
peasant workers, industrial workers, business and service workers, baby sitters and hourly 
workers; 2) professionals and technicians, including researchers, college professors, 
teachers, technicians and engineers, doctors and nurses, commercial and sales persons, 
lawyers and other legal service providers, private business owners; 3) cadres and managers, 
including government officials, CCP administrators, and managers in enterprises. Visitors’ 
enterprises are grouped, in terms of ownership structure, into public-owned, privately 
owned, foreign invested enterprises and other enterprises.   
The summary statistics of social network measurements are presented in Table 3.6. 
Compared to offspring without a cadre parent, those with a cadre parent have more non-
family member visitors, greater proportion of visitors being professionals/ technicians and 
government official/enterprises managers, and a greater proportion of visitors from public-
owned enterprises.   
 90 
 
We then control for a broad range of variables48 to see whether the social network 
characteristics differ significantly between offspring with a cadre parent and those without 
a cadre parent, the results of which are reported in Table 3.7.  
The first two columns in Table 3.7 reports the Poisson regression results of the 
cadre parent effect on the number of family/non-family visitors, respectively.49 Offspring 
with cadre parents have, on average, 6.8% more family member visitors and 9.8% more 
non-family member visitors in the Spring Festival, compared to those without a cadre 
parent. These suggest that cadre parents are associated with a larger size of social networks 
within and beyond the family. Columns (3) - (5) report whether visitors’ occupation differ 
significantly between those with and without a cadre parent. The estimations are obtained 
based on probit models with robust standard errors. The estimations reveal that individuals 
with a cadre parent are more likely to have visitors being government officials/managers. 
Columns (6) - (8) present whether the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises differ 
much between those with a cadre parent and those without. The results show that 
individuals with a cadre parent are more likely to have visitors from public-owned 
enterprises and less likely to have visitors from privately-owned enterprises, compared to 
those without a cadre parent. To summarize, individuals with a cadre parent have larger 
social network and closer relations with government officials, managers and people from 
the public-owned enterprises, which are independent of individual/parental and 
occupational characteristics.  
                                                          
48 In all eight specifications, the control variables include: fathers' income in 2005, parents' CCP membership, 
parents' educational level, individuals' education, CCP membership, cadre status, marital status, working 
experience and its quadratic form, enterprise ownership, as well as provincial dummies. 
49 We also ran zero inflated Poisson regression for the same specifications, and the results are similar to what 
are presented here.  
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To further explore whether cadre-parent premium is associated with social 
networks, Table 3.8 presents the OLS regression results adding individuals' social network 
measurements to the “standard” specification. In addition to controls in the “standard” 
specification, column (1) adds controls for the number of family and non-family member 
visitors. Column (2) adds only controls for visitors’ occupations aside of the controls in the 
“standard” specification. Column (3) only adds controls for the ownership structures of 
visitors’ enterprises.  Column (4) includes all the controls in column (1) and adds controls 
for visitors’ occupations. Column (5) includes all the controls regarding to the number, 
occupation and enterprise ownership of visitors. The estimated cadre parent premium in 
columns (1), (2) and (4) barely change compared to the estimation in the “standard” 
specification. When the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises are controlled for in 
Columns (3) and (5), the estimated cadre parent premium shrinks from 9.5% (significant 
at 5% level) to 7.2% and becomes insignificant. When all the social network variables are 
included in the regression, the cadre-parent coefficient at the mean level further shrinks to 
5.9% and becomes insignificant.  
It is notable that among the social network measurements, the ownership structures 
of visitors’ enterprises are the most important influence regarding the cadre parent 
premium. Literature suggests that there exist rent-seeking activities between government 
and enterprises (see Choi and Zhou 2001, Jia et al. 2013), especially the public-owned 
enterprises (POEs)50 (Cheung, Jin, Rau, and Stouraitis 2005). It is possible that POEs may 
pay the offspring of cadres with higher wages to “buy" the networks of their parents. With 
                                                          
50 In our study, POEs include both collectively owned enterprise and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
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closer social networks within the public sectors (government and pseudo-government 
organizations), cadre parents have greater chance to affect their offspring's wages in POEs. 
Considering that individuals with cadre parents have greater proportion of Spring Festival 
visitors in public-owned enterprises, we have reason to believe that cadre parent wage 
premium is associated with the social networks within the system of public-owned 
enterprises. 
However, social networks do not explain cadre-parent effects on individuals’ 
promotion prospects (Table 3.9). After controlling for a set of social network variables, 
cadre-parent effects on promotion remain significant and somewhat constant across various 
specifications. The position promotion probability is 6% higher, the wage promotion 
probability 9% higher, for individuals with a cadre parent, compared to those without a 
cadre parent.  
The above analysis reveals that cadre parent wage premium can be somewhat 
explained by social networks within the system of public-owned enterprises. However, 
social networks barely affect the cadre parent effects on promotion.  
3.5.2 Quality of Human Capital 
In the standard regression model, individuals' years of education have been 
controlled for, which means the cadre-parent premium does not come from offspring's 
longer years of schooling. However, there are reasons why years of schooling might not 
reflect all the differences in offspring's human capital. These reasons include the effects of 
the one-child policy and the low cost in public education in China. The one-child policy 
restricts families in the cities to have only one child. Thus, parents tend to concentrate their 
investment on the only child so that the child will become better economic providers in 
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their parents' old age. At the same time, the 9-year compulsory education programs secure 
the chance for every child in the urban area to obtain at least junior-high school education. 
The tuition in high-school, colleges and universities are affordable even for children in 
non-cadre families to obtain better education. These policies narrow the differences in 
years of schooling for individuals in cadre-families and non-cadre families. However, these 
institutions do not rule out the possibility that children of cadres may be more likely to 
enter better schools, or are equipped with skills that have higher return in the labor market. 
51 If evidence were found in favor of this transmission path, the policy implication may be 
balancing the pre-labor market differences of individuals from different family 
backgrounds by supporting children from the less privileged families. In this part, we 
examine whether having a cadre parent is associated with better school choices, longer 
years of education, as well as better English skills. The estimations are reported in Table 
3.10.  
Columns 1-3 in Table 3.10 report logit regression results examining whether 
individuals having a cadre parent have greater probabilities of going to better schools. 
Better schools refer to “key schools", which are products of the centrally planned economy 
in socialist China. Due to scarce educational resources in planned economy, some 
educational institutions were selected as “key schools", which were given priority in 
getting better teachers, equipment’s, and funds from the central government. In the post-
transition period, these key schools remain as the best schools within their regions. Key 
                                                          
51 Even though the cadre parent variable is measured when individuals are adults, it is likely that cadre parents’ 
have higher abilities and better human capital investment strategies. It follows that their children are more 
likely to be equipped with higher than average abilities and are more likely to be admitted by top schools. 
Therefore, here we assume that cadre-parents have effects on human capital qualities of their sons and 
daughters.  
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schools only admit top students, and students enrolled are better trained so as they are more 
likely to be admitted by top schools at the next level (Tsang 2003). Having a cadre parent 
does not have a significant influence on the probability of entering better elementary 
schools, better junior middle schools, or better high schools. Column 4 reports ordered logit 
regression results on whether having a cadre parent will significantly affect individuals' 
English skills, an important skill that ensures individuals a good job (Pan and Block 2011). 
The result shows that no significant effect is found to support the argument that children 
having a cadre parent have better English skills. Column 5 shows that having a cadre parent 
does not lead to longer years of schooling for offspring. These indicate that having a cadre 
parent does not lead to better school choices, better English skills, or higher educational 
attainment. Hence, the cadre-parent-premium does not come from the observable quality 
differences in the offspring's human capital. 
3.6 Conclusions 
During China’s transition from a central planned economy to a market driven one, 
there’s a heated debate on whether the second generation of cadres can benefit from their 
privileged parents in terms of labor market outcomes. Despite the existence of evidence 
indicating that having a cadre parent benefits offspring’s career outcome, previous 
literature does not account for differences in detailed job characteristics and social 
networks among workers, which may confound causal inference of cadre parent premium.  
This study empirically explores whether the cadre parent career effects are due to 
parents’ privileged status per se, or it reflects differences in skills, occupations, and social 
networks between individuals with and without cadre parents. It contributes to the existing 
literature from the following aspects. First, in addition to the wage premium, this study also 
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looks into how cadre parents affect individual’s promotion prospects that has not been 
covered in previous research. Second, incorporating a rich set of detailed job characteristics, 
the estimation captures wage effects due to differences in labor quality, tastes and job 
attributes that are not controlled for in previous China-based studies. Third, this study 
incorporates social networks as a transmission mechanism of cadre-parent premium, which 
has not been discussed in this line of work.  
Empirically, this study highlights the following findings.  First, a cadre parent does 
lead to better promotion prospects for offspring. We find that having a cadre parent is 
associated with around 6% of higher rate of position promotions and around 8% of higher 
rate of wage promotions. This effect is independent of individual/parental and detailed 
occupation-related characteristics. 
Second, the cadre parent wage premium is around 10% at the mean level, which is 
independent of individual and parental characteristics. Detailed occupational 
characteristics explain most of the cadre parent premium for individuals in the above-
median income groups, which implies that these individuals benefit from cadre parents 
mainly from obtaining occupations that yield higher returns in labor market. The cadre 
parent premium at the mean level, however, cannot be explained away when detailed 
occupational characteristics are controlled for.  
Further exploration reveals that cadre parent premium does not come from human 
capital quality differences, but is associated with an individual’s social network differences. 
Evidence shows that individuals with cadre parents have larger size of social networks 
within and beyond families. They also have closer relations with government officials, 
managers and people from public-owned enterprises. When social network measurements 
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are controlled for, the mean-level cadre parent premium shrinks and becomes statistically 
insignificant. This reveals that the cadre parent wage premium documented in previous 
literature could be biased upward. One possible mechanism through which cadre parent 
premium is transmitted across generations: social networks. One interpretation may be that 
individuals with a cadre parent are endowed with some unobserved social skills that help 
them build up valuable social networks, which brings about higher labor market returns. 
Another interpretation is that cadre parents’ privileges enable their children’s access to 
valuable social networks, which are not available for individuals without a cadre parent. It 
is this social network difference that leads to the observed cadre-parent wage premium. 
Whichever interpretation is valid, having a cadre parent does serve as a type of social 
capital that individuals can lean on as their career develops.  
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Table 3.1A  Summary Statistics of Major Variables for Chapter 3 
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Table 3.1B  Summary Statistics of Major Variables for Chapter 3 
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Table 3.2 Income Transmission Matrices, Cadre Parent Group vs. Non-Cadre Parent Group 
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          Table 3.3 Cadre-parent Premium: Results from OLS Regression 
 
  
101 
Table 3.4 Cadre-parent Coefficient Sensitivity to Specifications 
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         Table 3.5 Cadre-parent Effects: Promotion 
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  Table 3.6 Descriptive Summaries of Spring Festival Visitors 
 
Non Cadre Parent Cadre Parent |t|-stat
Total Number of Visitors 28.32 30.88 1.44
Number of Family Visitors 14.11 14.28 0.19
Number of non-Family Visitors 14.21 16.61 1.93
Visitors: Public-Owned Enterprises 0.27 0.37 2.79
Visitors: Privately Owned Enterprises 0.39 0.30 2.69
Visitors: Foreign Invested Enterprises 0.05 0.10 2.41
Visitors: Other Ownership 0.26 0.20 1.64
Visitors: Peasants or Workers 0.91 0.90 0.58
Visitors: Professionals and Technicians 0.66 0.74 2.82
Visitors: Governement Officials and Enterprise Managers 0.27 0.43 4.26
Note: The statistics are calculated using the svy command in Stata 14.
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       Table 3.7 Cadre Parent Effects on Offspring’s Social Networks 
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   Table 3.8 Cadre-parent Wage Effects, Controlling for Social Network Measurements 
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                    Table 3.9 Cadre-parent Promotion Effects, Controlling for Social Network Measurements 
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Table 3.10 Cadre Parent and Human Capital Quality Differences 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS FOR CHAPTER 1 
[Proof of Proposition 1] 
In the starting wage contracts from type 𝑗 supervisor to type 𝑖 workers as follows: 
𝑤௜,௞,ଵ
௝ = 𝜃𝑢ప,௞,ଵ
ఫ෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௜,௞,ଵ 
                                                = 𝜃 ቂ൫𝜌௞
௝൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௜,௞,ଵ + 𝜖௜
௝൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௞
௝൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௜,௞,ଵ 
In this wage contract, the weight that type 𝑗 supervisor put on type 𝑖 worker’s true 
productivity is  
                                                θ൫𝜌௞
௝൯
ଶ
+ 1 − 𝜃 
In predominantly male occupations (𝑝௠ < 0.5),  𝑝௠ଶ < (1 − 𝑝௠)ଶ, we have 𝜌௠ ௠ >
 𝜌௠ 
௙ , implying that male supervisors put more weight on workers’ signal and less weight 
on workers’ group average productivity, compared to female supervisors. In predominantly 
female occupations (𝑝௙ > 0.5),  𝑝௙ଶ > ൫1 − 𝑝௙൯
ଶ
, we have 𝜌௙ ௠ >  𝜌௙ 
௙ , implying that female 
supervisors put more weight on workers’ signal and less weight on workers’ group average 
productivity, compared to male supervisors.   
For workers with skill attainments  A୧ , the average extent of skill mismatch if 
working with a female supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) = ൣ1 − (𝜌௞
௙)ଶ൧|𝑚 − A୧|. The average extent 
of skill mismatch if working with a male supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ) = [1 − (𝜌௞௠)ଶ]|𝑚 − A୧|. 
In predominantly male occupations,  𝜌௜,௠ ௠ >  𝜌௜,௠ 
௙ , we have  𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) >   𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ).  In 
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predominantly female occupations ( 𝑝௙ > 0.5) ,  𝑝௙ଶ > ൫1 − 𝑝௙൯
ଶ
, we have   𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) <  
𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ).   
 End of Proof.  
 [Proof of Proposition 2] 
The average starting wage for female workers with female supervisors in 
predominantly female occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝜃𝑢௙,௙,ଵ
௙෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵ 
= E{𝜃 ቂ൫𝜌௙
௙൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௙,௙,ଵ + 𝜖௙,௙
௙ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௙
௙൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵ}  = m 
The average wages for male workers with male supervisors in predominantly 
female occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଵ௠ ൯ = θ𝑢௠,௙,ଵ௠෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௙,ଵ 
= 𝐸 ቄቂ൫𝜌௙௠൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௠,௙,ଵ + 𝜖௠,௙௠ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௙௠൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௙,ଵቅ = m 
The average wages for male workers with female supervisors in predominantly 
female occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௠,௙,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝜃𝑢௠,௙,ଵ
௙෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௙,ଵ 
= E{𝜃 ቂ൫𝜌௙
௙൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௠,௙,ଵ + 𝜖௠,௙
௙ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௙
௙൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௙,ଵ}  = m 
 The average wages for female workers with male supervisors in predominantly 
female occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௙,௙,ଵ௠ ൯ = θ𝑢௙,௙,ଵ௠෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵ 
= 𝐸 ቄቂ൫𝜌௙௠൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௙,௙,ଵ + 𝜖௙,௙௠ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௙௠൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௙,ଵቅ = m 
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The average wages for male workers with female supervisors in predominantly 
male occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝜃𝑢௠,௠,ଵ
௙෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௠,ଵ 
= E{𝜃 ቂ൫𝜌௠
௙ ൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௠,௠,ଵ + 𝜖௠,௠
௙ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௠
௙ ൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௠,ଵ}  = m 
 The average wages for male workers with male supervisors in predominantly male 
occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௠,௠,ଵ௠ ൯ = θ𝑢௠,௠,ଵ௠෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௠,ଵ 
= 𝐸൛ൣ(𝜌௠௠)ଶ൫𝑢௠,௠,ଵ + 𝜖௠,௠௠ ൯ + (1 − (𝜌௠௠)ଶ)𝑚൧ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௠,௠,ଵൟ = m 
The average wages for female workers with male supervisors in predominantly 
male occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௙,௠,ଵ௠ ൯ = θ𝑢௙,௠,ଵ௠෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௠,ଵ 
= 𝐸൛ൣ(𝜌௠௠)ଶ൫𝑢௙,௠,ଵ + 𝜖௙,௠௠ ൯ + (1 − (𝜌௠௠)ଶ)𝑚൧ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௠,ଵൟ = m 
The average wages for female workers with female supervisors in predominantly 
male occupation is  
𝐸൫𝑤௙,௠,ଵ
௙ ൯ = 𝜃𝑢௙,௠,ଵ
௙෣ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௠,ଵ 
= E{𝜃 ቂ൫𝜌௠
௙ ൯
ଶ
൫𝑢௙,௠,ଵ + 𝜖௙,௠
௙ ൯ + ቀ1 − ൫𝜌௠
௙ ൯
ଶ
ቁ 𝑚ቃ + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢௙,௠,ଵ}  = m 
End of Proof.  
[Proof of Proposition 3] 
In stage 2, workers’ true productivity is realized, and each of them is paid according 
to the realized productivity 𝑢௜.  
𝑢௜ =  f(A୧, R୩) = 𝑅௞ − 𝑄௜,௞
௝  
The average wage for workers of type i with female supervisors in occupation k is 
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E൫𝑢௜,௞
௙ ൯ =  f(A୧, R୩) = R୩ − ൣ1 − (𝜌௞
௙)ଶ൧|𝑚 − A୧| 
The average wage for workers of type i with male supervisors in occupation k is  
E൫𝑢௜,௞௠ ൯ =  f(A୧, R୩) = R୩ − [1 − (𝜌௞௠)ଶ]|𝑚 − A୧| 
The proof of proposition 1 shows that in predominantly male occupations,  𝜌௜,௠ ௠ >
 𝜌௜,௠ 
௙ , we have  𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) >  𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ).  In predominantly female occupations (𝑝௙ > 0.5) ,  
𝑝௙ଶ > ൫1 − 𝑝௙൯
ଶ
, we have  𝐸(𝑄௜,௞
௙ ) <  𝐸(𝑄௜,௞௠ ).   
Therefore, we have: (1) in predominantly male occupations, E൫𝑢௜,௞
௙ ൯< E൫𝑢௜,௞௠ ൯; (2) 
in predominantly female occupations, E൫𝑢௜,௞
௙ ൯> E൫𝑢௜,௞௠ ൯.   
End of Proof.  
[Proof of Proposition 4] 
In predominantly female occupations, for female stayers, 
ቐ𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ + ൫𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇൯ × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏ቑ ×  ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 < 𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ +
(𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇) × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏} ×  ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐  . 
The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor is 
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor.  
For male stayers, 
ቐ𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ + ൫𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇൯ × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏ቑ ×  ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 < {𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×
቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ + (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇) × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏} ×  ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐. 
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The inter-period wage gain conditioning on staying with a male supervisor is higher 
than the gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor.  
Similarly, in predominantly male occupations, for female stayers,  
ቐ𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
቏ + (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎) × 𝜽 × ൤
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
൨ቑ × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 > 𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×
቎ 𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
቏ + (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎) × 𝜽 × ൤
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
൨} × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐  . 
The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor is 
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor.  
For male stayers,  
ቐ𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 × ቎
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
቏ + (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎) × 𝜽 × ൤
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
൨ቑ × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 > {𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×
቎ 𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
቏ + (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎) × 𝜽 × ൤
𝟏ି(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
൨} × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐. 
The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor is 
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor.  
To sum up, stayers with the same-gender supervisors obtain lower inter-period 
wage gains compared to stayers with the opposite-gender supervisors, in occupations with 
larger proportion of same-gender workers.  
[Proof of Proposition 5] 
In predominantly female occupation, the inter-period wage gains for movers with: 
(1) female supervisors in both stages: 
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𝐸൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ
௙෣ ) = {
𝜽 ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒇ቁ
𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
} × ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(2) female supervisors in stage 1 and male supervisors in stage 2:  
𝑬 ቀ𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟏
𝒇 − 𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟐𝒎 ቚ 𝒖𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 < 𝒖ଙ,𝒇,𝟐𝒎෣ ) = {
[𝜽 ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒇ቁ
𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒇𝒎)𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽]
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇𝒎)𝟐
} × ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(3) male supervisors in stage 1 and female supervisors in stage 2:  
𝐸൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ
௙෣ ) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡𝜽൫𝝆𝒇𝒎൯
𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
× ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(4) male supervisors in both stages: 
E൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ௠෣ ) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡𝜽൫𝝆𝒇𝒎൯
𝟐
+ ൫𝝆𝒇𝒎൯
𝟐
+ 𝟏 − 𝜽
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇𝒎)𝟐 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
× ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
It is easy to show that  
𝐸൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ
௙෣ ) >  𝑬 ቀ𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟏
𝒇 − 𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟐𝒎 ቚ 𝒖𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 < 𝒖ଙ,𝒇,𝟐𝒎෣ )
> E൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ௠෣ ) 
𝐸൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ
௙෣ ) > 𝐸൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ
௙෣ )
> E൫𝑤௜,௙,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௙,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௙,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௙,ଶ௠෣ ) 
The inter-period wage gains for movers with supervisors of different gender in 
different period depend on θ, the order of which cannot be listed unambiguously.  
In predominantly male occupation, the inter-period wage gains for movers with: 
(1) female supervisors in both stages: 
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𝐸൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ
௙෣ ) = {
𝜽ቀ𝝆𝒎
𝒇 ቁ
𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
} × ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(2) female supervisors in stage 1 and male supervisors in stage 2:  
𝑬ቀ𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟏
𝒇 − 𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟐𝒎 ቚ𝒖𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 < 𝒖ଙ,𝒎,𝟐𝒎෣ ) = {
[𝜽ቀ𝝆𝒎
𝒇 ቁ
𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽]
ඥ𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
} × ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(3) male supervisors in stage 1 and female supervisors in stage 2:  
𝐸൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ
௙෣ ) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡𝜽(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
ට𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
× ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
(4) male supervisors in both stages: 
E൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ௠෣ ) = ቈ
𝜽(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐 + (𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
ඥ𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
቉ × ቆ
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝝅
ቇ
𝟏
𝟐
 
It is easy to show that  
E൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ௠෣ ) >  𝑬ቀ𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟏
𝒇 − 𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟐𝒎 ቚ𝒖𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 < 𝒖ଙ,𝒎,𝟐𝒎෣ )
> 𝐸൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ
௙෣ ) 
E൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ௠ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ௠ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ௠෣ ) >  𝐸൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ
௠ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ
௙෣ )
> 𝐸൫𝑤௜,௠,ଵ
௙ − 𝑤௜,௠,ଶ
௙ ห𝑢௜,௠,ଵ < 𝑢ప,௠,ଶ
௙෣ ) 
The inter-period wage gains for movers with supervisors of different gender in 
different period depend on θ, the order of which cannot be listed unambiguously.  
End of Proof.  
 [Proof of Proposition 6] 
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(1) In predominantly female occupations, the return to one-year labor market 
experience for stayers is [ ଵିగ೑
ටଵା(ఘ೑
೘)మ
+ గ೑
ටଵା(ఘ೑
೑)మ
] × ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ ; the return to one-year labor 
market experience for movers with supervisor j is 
(ఘ೑
ೕ )మ
ටଵା(ఘ೑
ೕ )మ
× ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ.  
Since (𝜌௙௠)ଶ < (𝜌௙
௙)ଶ , we have  ቎ ଵିగ೑
ටଵା(ఘ೑
೘)మ
+ గ೑
ටଵା(ఘ೑
೑)మ
቏ × ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ > ଵ
ටଵା(ఘ೑
೑)మ
×
ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ >
(ఘ೑
ೕ )మ
ටଵା(ఘ೑
ೕ )మ
× ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ. Stayers’ one-year labor market experience has higher return 
compared to that of movers’ one-year labor market experience.  
 In predominantly male occupations, the return to one-year labor market experience for 
stayers is [ ଵିగ೘
ඥଵା(ఘ೘೘)మ
+ గ೘
ටଵା(ఘ೘
೑ )మ
] × ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ; the return to one-year labor market experience 
for movers with supervisor j is (ఘ೘
ೕ )మ
ටଵା(ఘ೘
ೕ )మ
× ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ.  
Since (𝜌௠௠)ଶ > (𝜌௠
௙ )ଶ , we have  ቎ ଵିగ೑
ඥଵା(ఘ೘೘)మ
+ గ೑
ටଵା(ఘ೘
೑ )మ
቏ × ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ > ଵ
ඥଵା(ఘ೘೘)మ
×
ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ > (ఘ೘
ೕ )మ
ටଵା(ఘ೘
ೕ )మ
× ቀଶఎ
మ
గ
ቁ
భ
మ. Stayers’ one-year labor market experience has higher return 
compared to that of movers’ one-year labor market experience.  
(2) In predominantly female occupations, return to one-year labor market 
experience for female workers moving to work with female supervisors is [
ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒇ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] ×
 131 
 
ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 , which is higher than that of female workers who move to work with male 
supervisors ([
ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒎ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).  The return to one-year labor market experience for male 
workers moving to work with female supervisors is [
ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒇ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐, which is higher 
than that of male workers who move to work with male supervisors ([
ቀ𝝆𝒇
𝒎ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).   
In predominantly male occupations, return to one-year labor market experience for female 
workers moving to work with female supervisors is [
ቀ𝝆𝒎
𝒇 ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐, which is lower 
than that of female workers who move to work with male supervisors ([ (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).  
The return to one-year labor market experience for male workers moving to work with 
female supervisors is [
ቀ𝝆𝒎
𝒇 ቁ
𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐, which is lower than that of male workers who 
move to work with male supervisors ([ (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)𝟐
ඥ𝟏ା(𝝆𝒎𝒎)𝟐
] × ቀ𝟐𝜼
𝟐
𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).   
To sum up, in occupations with larger proportion of same-gender workers, workers 
move to same-gender supervisors have higher return to labor market experience. In 
occupations with larger proportion of opposite-gender workers, workers move to same-
gender supervisors have lower return to labor market experience.   
End of Proof.  
[Proof of Proposition 7] 
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In predominantly female occupations, the unconditional expectation of second-
stage wage for female workers with the female supervisors is 𝒎 +  [ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+
𝝅𝒇ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐, which is higher than that of female workers with the male supervisors 
(𝐦 + [
𝟏ି𝝅𝒇ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+ 𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).  
This is because: 𝒎 + ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+
𝝅𝒌ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 = 𝐦 + ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+
𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
+
(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 > 𝐦 + ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+ 𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
+
(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐. 
In predominantly female occupations, the unconditional expectation of second-
stage wage for male workers with the female supervisors is 𝒎 + [ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+
𝝅𝒇ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐, which is higher than that of male workers with the male supervisors 
(𝒎 + [
𝟏ି𝝅𝒇ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+ 𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
] × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐).  
This is because: 
 𝒎 +  ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+
𝝅𝒇ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 = 𝒎 + ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+ 𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆,𝒇
𝒇 )𝟐
+
(𝝆,𝒇
𝒇 )𝟐 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 >
𝒎 + ቎ 𝟏ି𝝅𝒇
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
+ 𝝅𝒇 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆𝒇
𝒇)𝟐
+
(𝝆,𝒇
𝒎)𝟐 
ට𝟏ା(𝝆,𝒇
𝒎)𝟐
቏ × ቀ𝜼
𝟐
𝟐𝝅
ቁ
𝟏
𝟐 
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The proposition with respect to predominantly male occupations can be proved in 
similar ways. 
End of Proof.  
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APPENDIX C 
LINKING THE ASVAB SCORES TO O*NET KSA COMPOSITE52 FOR 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
                                                          
52  This table is listed in the “The ASVAB Career Exploration Program: Theoretical and Technical 
Underpinnings of the Revised Skill Composites and OCCU-Find” (2010, p23-24), which is downloaded from 
http://www.asvabprogram.com/downloads/Technical Chapter 2010.pdf. (Final version Feb,2011) 
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APPENDIX D
EXAMPLES OF JOBS AND TASKS/SKILLS IN THE WORK 
ACTIVITIES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Task Measures 
Following Autor and Acemoglu (2010), the tasks and skills in the work activities are 
defined as follows:  
Non-routine cognitive: Analytical 
Analyzing data/information 
Thinking creatively 
Interpreting information for others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive analytical tasks: actuaries, 
physicists and astronomers, economists, market researcher and survey researcher 
Non-routine cognitive: Interpersonal 
Establishing and maintaining personal relationships 
Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates 
Coaching/Developing others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive interpersonal tasks: clergy and 
religious workers, athletes, sports instructors, and officials 
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Routine cognitive 
Importance of repeating the same task 
Importance of being exact or accurate 
Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)  
Examples of jobs with intensive routine cognitive tasks: telephone operators, transportation 
ticket and reservation agents, and cashiers 
Routine manual 
Pace determined by speed of equipment 
Controlling machines and processes 
Spend time making repetitive motions 
Examples of jobs with intensive routine manual tasks: machine operators, winding and 
twisting textile/apparel operatives, crane, derrick, winch and hoist operators 
Non-routine manual physical 
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment 
Spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools, or controls 
Manual dexterity 
Spatial orientation 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual physical tasks: airplane pilots and 
navigators, excavating and loading machine operators, millwrights, taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs 
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Non-routine manual interpersonal 
Performing for or working directly with the public 
Provide consultation and advice to others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual interpersonal tasks: psychologists,  
managers of food-serving and lodging establishments, actors, directors and producers 
We further utilized Autor and Dorn’s aggregation to group all occupations to the 1-digit 
level as follows: 
management/professional/technical/financial/sales/public security,  
administrative support and retail sales,  
low-skill service,  
precision production and craft, machine operators, assemblers and inspectors 
transportation/construction/mechanics-/mining/agricultural.  
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APPENDIX E
VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENTS FOR CHAPTER 3 
Table E.1 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables 
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 Table E.2 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables (cont.) 
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      Table E.3 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables (cont.) 
 
 
